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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 2
Environmental Policy has become an increasingly important topic over the last
decades. Issues such as acid rain, ozone depletion and most recently climate change
required global regulation in order to avoid serious damages to the environment.
Whereas the acid rain and ozone depletion issues have been successfully dealt with
(Barrett, 2003), the global community has not been able to address climate change
on a global scale. The European Union has been spearheading global climate change
efforts by implementing an Emissions Trading System for CO2 emissions for most of
its industrial and energy producers, but due to lacking global support efforts have
been reduced. One important issue is how to integrate developing countries which
do not have an emission limiting system in place with developed countries that do.
A mechanism that has been set up to deal with this issue is the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). Developed country companies can invest into projects operating
in developing countries, and receive emission permits in their home market for the
emission reduction their involvement brings about. This mechanism was supposed
to increase abatement activity in developing countries, as well as decrease the cost
of complying with permit markets in developed countries.
Chapter 2 of this thesis,”Technology Transfer Mechanisms and International Co-
operation to Combat Climate Change”, evaluates the effectiveness of the CDM and
proposes an alternative mechanism to address a range of issues for which it has
been criticized. Specifically, a new technology transfer mechanism is proposed, la-
beled Green Technology Banks, as part of a climate change agreement that includes
emission limits for developed and developing countries. The mechanism is evalu-
ated according to the following five criteria, standard in the literature that analyses
technology-oriented agreements: environmental effectiveness, technological effective-
ness, economic efficiency, incentives for participation and administrative feasibility.
Under the assumption that several permit markets exist that are imperfectly linked,
it is shown that the mechanism performs well according to the specified criteria,
while the largest obstacle remains the acceptance of emission limits by developing
countries. However, ancillary benefits, access to advanced technology and increased
government revenue from emission trading represent a sizable compensation pack-
age. Developed countries would have to shoulder most of the cost, but considering
the recent efforts to establish the Green Climate Fund as part of a new international
climate change architecture, the willingness to pay for such efforts seems to be on
the rise.
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This chapter is single authored. It was published in 2012 in the journal ”Climate
and Development”, Volume 4, issue 2, pages 78-87.
Chapter 3
Another important issue concerning the CDM is its effect on investment into re-
newable energy in developed countries. Theoretically, it reduces the incentive to
invest into renewable energy sources since it allows the usage of cheaper permits
(Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008). This effect has not been studied quantitatively in an
uncertain investment environment. Permit prices on the European emissions mar-
ket are highly influenced by political process and have seen large drops and rises
since its inception. Furthermore, energy investment is considered as irreversible. A
methodology that is well suited to address such an issue is real-options theory.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis,”The Clean-Development Mechanism, Stochastic Per-
mit Prices and Energy Investments”, the impact on energy investments stemming
from different emission permit classes is analyzed. Permits that are allocated in-
side the European Emission Trading Scheme and secondary Certified Emission Re-
ductions permits (sCER) originating from the Clean Development Mechanism are
considered. One price taking firm which is subject to emission regulation has the
choice to invest into a gas or a wind power plant. The firm faces uncertainty re-
garding stochastically evolving permits prices, while it receives a premium on the
electricity price for wind energy. As a first step, the value of the option to invest
into a gas power plant over time is determined. Then, the investment probability
of a gas power investment in a range of policy scenarios is calculated. Allowing the
usage of sCER permits in the present policy framework has a positive impact on
gas power investment. Decoupling the price processes has a similar effect. If the
quota of sCER permits is doubled, the decrease in the investment probability for
wind power is large. Finally, we ran sensitivity tests for different parameter values.
We find that investment behavior changes significantly with differing interest rates,
the wind energy premium and volatility rate.
The chapter is based on a cooperation with Prof. Philipp Hieronymi from the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Mathematics.
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Chapter 4
Lobbying activity from companies, NGOs, fossil energy and renewable energy pro-
ducers have increased since the aforementioned environmental issues became a po-
litical priority. In Europe large lobbying organizations such as EUR-ELECTRIC
representing large energy producers with high CO2 levels, or the European Wind
Energy Association with over 700 members from 60 countries have been formed.
Whereas the latter organization is interested in achieving a more generous support
mechanism for its members, such as feed-in tariffs, the former is more interested in
reducing the burden environmental policy puts on its members. One example of
reducing the burden is trying to increase the overall cap of the Emission Trading
System, thereby lowering the price per permit. Considering the impact of lobbying
from a real-options perspective in an uncertain environment with respect to permit
prices has not been analyzed in the literature so far.
Chapter 4,”The Influence of Permit Price Uncertainty and Lobbying on Energy
Investments”, addresses the issue of how an investor chooses when facing the choice
to replace a pre-determined generation capacity by investing into wind or gas power.
If he chooses gas power, he has to obtain emission permits. The permit price devel-
ops according to a geometric Brownian Motion. Furthermore, the investor can fund
lobbying efforts, rendering gas or wind power more profitable. We find that cur-
rent permit prices are insufficient to induce renewable investment and wind power
lobbying must be very effective in order to induce investment in this power type.
Gas power lobbying is largely too costly due to the low permit price. In a United
States-like situation with no permit market, no effective renewable support scheme,
and very strong gas lobbying efforts, close to no renewable capacity will be installed.
Depending on the scenario, the social cost of subsidizing wind energy can be large.
The chapter is again based on a cooperation with Prof. Philipp Hieronymi from
the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Department of Mathematics.
Chapter 5 and 6
Whereas the previous chapters addressed the issues of technology transfer and energy
investment under uncertainty, chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis consider pro-social
behavior in the setting of the TV-Show Come Dine with Me from a theoretical
and empirical point of view. In the show, five contestants prepare a dinner for
each other during the course of a week and evaluate each other’s performance. The
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winner receives a monetary prize. Evaluations remain concealed until the show is
broadcast. Because actual voting behavior remains concealed during the show, a
contestant could evaluate his/her opponents with zero in an effort to increase his
own chances of winning without risking later punishment in the form of low scores.
However, when looking at the actual data from the show, such behavior is virtually
never observed. One potential explanation for this observation is that interaction
between human beings is, to a large extent, governed by social norms that have
evolved over time and have been instilled in us since childhood. In the absence of
compliance to social norms, everyday interaction would be difficult because every
situation would require the persons involved to establish acceptable behavior anew
or to coordinate regarding some mutually acceptable behavior. Compliance with
a social norm can be enforced through so-called moralistic punishment. Moralistic
punishment is defined as: “. . . the enforcement of social norms by outraged but
otherwise not directly affected third parties” (Carpenter and Matthews (2012), p.
555). Another important dimension that leads people to adhere to norms is the
potential loss of reputation in the eyes of their peers, often termed social approval
(Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Bernheim, 1994; Holla¨nder, 1990). In his seminal
article, Bernheim (1994) postulates: “When popularity is sufficiently important
relative to intrinsic utility (defined as utility directly derived from consumption),
many individuals conform to a single, homogenous standard of behavior, despite
heterogeneous underlying preferences” (p. 844). Bernheim’s model also allows for
deviations from a norm for agents with extreme preferences. This explains the
need for third party punishment, because in certain situations the intrinsic utility
gain may lead to deviations from the norm. Considering these potential factors of
influence on voting behavior of participants in the TV-Show, we investigate whether
they can help to explain why participants do not seem to evaluate each other with
a zero.
In chapter 5, ”Come Dine with Me: a Game-Theoretic Analysis”, we interpret
popular the TV-show Come Dine with Me as a simultaneous non-cooperative game
with evaluation levels as strategic variables, and show that it belongs to a class
of strategic games which we call mutual evaluations games. Any mutual evaluation
game (MEG) possesses a zero equilibrium—i.e. a Nash equilibrium where all players
evaluate each other with the lowest available scores—as well as numerous non-zero
equilibria. Since the zero equilibrium is an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies,
it may arguably be regarded as the canonical equilibrium. Yet, in 212 rounds of the
German format of Come Dine with Me contestants never achieved this equilibrium,
5
nor did they (with one exception) play any other equilibrium. We provide potential
explanations for this behaviour by considering the impact of social pressure and
reputation mechanisms, bandwagon effects, inequality aversion and sequential voting
effects.
The chapter is based on a cooperation with Prof. Thorsten Upmann from the
University of Duisburg-Essen, Mercator School of Management. It is published in
the CESifo Working Paper Series, No. 4138.
Finally, chapter 6,”Pro-Social behavior in the TV format Come Dine with Me: An
empirical investigation”, considers the influence of social approval and reputation on
voting behavior in the German version of the TV format Come Dine with Me from
an empirical point of view. We test whether reputation, social in-game influences,
objective quality, or personal traits impact the voting behavior of participants, with
a dataset running from 2006 to 2011. We find that the objective sophistication of
a meal, the order of cooking, whether a person has already cooked, and the social
similarity between contestant and evaluator all have a significant influence on the
evaluating behavior. These findings help to improve the understanding of the impact
that reputation and social approval have on economic decision making.
The chapter is based on a cooperation with Prof. Thorsten Upmann and Daniel
Weimar from the University of Duisburg-Essen, Mercator School of Management,
and Prof. Harald Tauchmann, from the University of Erlangen-Nu¨rnberg.
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Chapter 2
Technology Transfer Mechanisms
and International Cooperation to
Combat Climate Change
2.1 Introduction
International cooperation to combat human induced climate change has so far not
been very effective. Even though there are a significant number of signatories to
the Kyoto protocol, it is often only considered a test-stage with limited impact.
The real cooperative effort that will be necessary is yet to come. Developing coun-
tries do not face CO2 emission limits under the protocol. But since they will be
responsible for the largest increase in emissions in the future this situation is unsus-
tainable. Developed countries are historically responsible for most of the emissions
currently circulating in the atmosphere. Therefore, the argument is made by devel-
oping countries that they should shoulder most of the abatement. Also, abatement
in developing countries is considerably less expensive than abating in developed
countries. This gives room to negotiate the terms, according to which developing
countries are willing to accept emission limits.
We propose a new technology transfer mechanism, which we label Green Tech-
nology Banks (GTB) as a side-payment within a new climate change agreement.
We make the following assumptions: Developing and developed countries accept
emission limits, but global emission markets are imperfectly linked, in the sense
that emission rights cannot simply be bought in one market and used in the other.
Furthermore, not all sectors in a region are regulated by emission caps. The central
research question we seek to address is how this mechanism performs according to
the following criteria: Environmental effectiveness, technological effectiveness, eco-
nomic efficiency, incentives for participation and administrative feasibility. We find
that the mechanism performs well according to these criteria, the largest obstacle
being the acceptance of emission limits by developing countries. We show that the
incentives for developing country companies and governments are substantial and
should compensate them for the accepting emission limits. We do not specify exact
amounts of emissions saved due to the mechanism, since this crucially depends on the
outcome of the negotiations process, which has proven to be highly unforeseeable.
The paper is structured as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present a brief overview on
the issues that are most important concerning technology transfer as part of inter-
national climate change agreements. In section 4 the technology transfer elements of
the Kyoto Protocol, the APP, and the most recent decisions taken at the conference
of the parties meeting in Cancu´n and Durban are analysed. In section 5 the GTB
is laid out and evaluated according to the previously mentioned criteria. Section 6
concludes.
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2.2 Global Public Goods and International coop-
eration
2.2.1 Global Public Goods
The global public good of a stable climate is affected by a range of externalities.
The most significant one is the insufficiently priced negative externality of emissions
caused by the conversion of fossil fuels into energy, leading to potentially drastic
climatic change involving potentially substantial costs. A second important exter-
nality related to climate change concerns the research and development (R&D) of
technologies that help to adapt or mitigate climate change. Concerning the issue
of R&D related to global environmental problems, Hoel (2005) show that if coun-
tries only consider the impact that R&D has on their own economy whereas the full
effect is global, R&D levels on climate technology are sub-optimal. Without an in-
ternational agreement, countries will only equate the marginal benefit of R&D with
the marginal environmental costs within their own borders. But R&D can lower
abatement costs globally. Climate technology might still reach other countries due
to spill-over effects. These technological spill-overs can reduce the CO2 ”leakage
effect”1, which occurs when no global agreement is in place. (Hoel and Golombek,
2005).
2.2.2 International Cooperation
Solving transboundary issues of pollution requires cooperation from at least two
states, in the case of climate change cooperation from most of the world (Stern,
2007). In contrast to pollution issues that happen within the borders of a state,
there is no agency that can force states to adhere to agreements made between
them unless they delegate that role to an international agency and decide to give up
sovereignty. In the case of human induced climate change this has not happened so
far. The Kyoto protocol in its current form does not have a favourable cost-benefit
ratio for Annex I countries when contrasting the costs that they have to incur in
order to fulfil their abatement obligations with the probable benefits they would
obtain from damages avoided in the future (Barrett, 2007). Whereas this cost-
benefit ratio was 1:11 for the Montreal Protocol for the participating industrialized
countries, this ratio stands at 1:0.5 for the Kyoto Protocol for Annex I parties
(Barrett, 2007). These numbers rely on results from estimations carried out by
Nordhaus and Boyer (1998). They recently revised their numbers and the ratio now
stands at 1:1.7 (Nordhaus, 2008). One way to increase the benefits of accession to
1The magnitude of the leakage effect is still under discussion (Paltsev, 2001; Kallbekken et al.,
2006).
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an agreement is via side-payments, commonly referred to as “carrots”. (McGinty,
2006) and (Barrett, 2003) show that asymmetry combined with side-payments can
substantially increases the number of signatories to an agreement compared to the
non-cooperative symmetric situation, the former for the case of climate change and
the later for ozone depletion.. Asymmetry in the context of climate change and
technology can be linked to at least three dimensions: Marginal costs of abatement
(Ellerman et al., World Bank Policy Research, 1998; Nordhaus and Boyer, 1998),
green technology and damages caused by climate change (Stern, 2007; IPCC, 2007a).
These asymmetries give scope for transfers from developed to developing countries.
2.3 Green-technology
2.3.1 Obstacles to an optimal allocation of green-technology
Three major obstacles hinder the spreading of already existing green-technology and
environmental R&D at sufficient levels taking into account its global effects. First
of all, it is largely produced by private companies in developed countries and it
is protected by patents that make it often unaffordable for governments and en-
trepreneurs in developing countries (Aghion et al., NBER Working Paper, 2007;
Teng et al., Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements Discussion Pa-
per,2008). Secondly, developed for conditions prevalent in industrialized countries,
it cannot easily be used in developing countries. In addition to this, developing
countries often do not have the capacity to adapt the technology to local circum-
stances (Arnold and Bell, 2001). Finally, there is no common and easily accessible
database or information source that gives a concise overview about the developments
in the field of green-technology and environmental R&D: “Technology infrastructure
such as data collection and dissemination, and training of scientists and engineers is
likely to be seriously underprovided by market incentives alone.” (Jaffe et al., 2005,
p.173). This lack of information combined with the two previous hindrances results
in a suboptimal adoption of green-technologies.
2.3.2 Green-Technology and the benefits of technology trans-
fer
The primary benefits of replacing a fossil fuel based infrastructure in developing
countries (IEA, 2008; Teng et al., Harvard Project on International Climate Agree-
ments Discussion Paper,2008) is a reduction in CO2 emissions, contributing to the
global public good of a stable climate. But one should also consider the ancillary
benefits that accrue to developed and developing countries under GHG mitigation
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policies and transfer of green-technology. Examples of ancillary benefits inherent to
GHG policies are an increase of habitat for endangered species, less soil erosion under
re-forestation, and reduction of other pollutants such as NOx, SO2, N2O, which lead
to positive health effects (Ru¨bbelke and Pittel, 2008). These benefits occur mostly in
the short-run and have the characteristics of a domestic public good (Ru¨bbelke and
Pittel, 2008) Ancillary benefits that are likely to occur specifically with technology
transfer are: A more efficient production process, higher product quality, reduced
energy loss and an improved design of material (Jochem and Madlener, 2003). Fur-
thermore, developing countries that can acquire new technology via such a transfer
have the chance to leapfrog between 20-40 years of technological development and
are likely to see a dramatic increase in resource efficiency. Concerning technolog-
ical capabilities and learning (Arnold and Bell, 2001, p.302) note: ”An important
omission from the available accounts of catch-up development is the creation and
role of ‘mid-level’ craft and technician skills, which are crucial to the absorption
and use of production technologies and to a great deal of innovative activity not
classed as formal R&D.” Therefore, skills which are usually omitted from classical
innovation studies focusing on R&D spending are also likely to profit significantly
from technology transfer. Finally, a movement away from bio-mass to either more
efficient oil heating or usage of renewable energies should dramatically increase the
productivity of poor households due to health benefits and less time necessary for
the collection of bio-mass (Sagar, 2005).
2.4 Current climate change protocols and tech-
nology transfer
The following analysis of the Kyoto Protocol and the APP will focus on technology
transfer elements of the two. For a more general review of technology agreements
we point the reader to de Coninck et al. (2008), who provide an excellent overview
and assessment over a range of technology agreements related to the mitigation of
climate change.
2.4.1 Kyoto Protocol
As mentioned above, the world does not only suffer a global externality from climate
changing emissions but also a lack of environmental related R&D that deals with
climate change relevant emissions. That externality is not sufficiently addressed in
the Kyoto protocol. There is no mechanism that would allow countries to take into
account the global effect of environmental related R&D, which leads to an under
provision (Hoel, 2005). Even if the permit trade that takes place under the Kyoto
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Protocol equalizes marginal abatement costs in participating regions and induces
more environmental R&D as a market “pull” effect (Jaffe et al., 2005; Lawrence,
2007), the level is still likely to be insufficient. A “pull” incentive can come from
increasing taxes on the undesirable economic good, fossil fuels in this case. A “push”
incentive can come in the form of research, better information or subsidies. (Hoel,
2005, p.59) notes:”. . . there will be too little R&D expenditure in the Kyoto type
agreement even if total emissions are set equal to what they are in the first-best
optimum”. Furthermore, the permit trade does not have any provisions in itself
addressing the issue of technology transfer between Annex I and Annex II parties.
Technology transfer may take place through technological spill-overs, but most likely
at levels that are insufficient.
The only way in which technology transfer is indirectly addressed in the protocol
is via its two mechanisms, the CDM and Joint Implementation (JI). The JI will
not be analysed in further depth here, as it concerns transfers from developed to
developed countries. Technology transfer is not a necessary condition for projects
under these mechanisms to take place. A study by Seres (2007) finds that about
39% of CDM projects claim to involve technology transfer. What exactly is meant
by technology transfer is not specified under CDM regulations. These projects are
responsible for 64% of all emission reductions achieved under CDM, which points
to the fact that it is often large projects that involve technology transfer. About
56% of projects that involve technology transfer claim to transfer equipment and
knowledge, 32% involve only knowledge. Projects with knowledge transfer alone
account for about 11% of all technology transfer projects.
The CDM has been subject to several lines of criticism over the years. The main
concern has been directed towards baseline methodology issues, which lead to a
significant oversupply of emission credits, depressing emission permit prices (Wara,
2008b; Bakker et al., 2011b). Other points of criticism concerned its actual contri-
bution to sustainable development, the lack of technology transfer, the distribution
of projects worldwide (95% in Asia and Latin America), and the level of transaction
cost involved in getting a project approved (Bakker et al., 2011b). A possible fix to
these problems would be better enforcement. But enforcement comes at the price of
higher transaction costs and many worthwhile projects especially at a smaller scale
are then unlikely to be carried out (Hagem and Holtsmark, SSB Discussion Paper,
2009).
2.4.2 APP
First announced at the 38th ASEAN Ministerial in Vientiane, Laos in 2005 the
Asian-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) was officially
launched in July 2006. One of the purposes of the partnership is to, ”Create a volun-
12
tary, non-legally binding framework for international cooperation to facilitate the de-
velopment, diffusion, deployment, and transfer of existing, emerging and longer term
cost- effective, cleaner, more efficient technologies and practices among the Partners
through concrete and substantial cooperation so as to achieve practical results.”2
Eight public-private task forces have been created in order to achieve this purpose
in different sectors, these are: Aluminium, building and appliances, cement, cleaner
fossil energy, coal mining, power generation and transmission, renewable energy
and distributed generation and finally steel. Currently the US, Australia, Canada,
Japan, South Korea, India and China are members to the APP. Together, they ac-
count for more than 50% of global climate change relevant emissions. de Coninck
et al. (2008) classify the APP as a knowledge sharing and coordination agreement.
This implies that emission limits are absent, limiting the incentive to adopt new
technology since the “push” side is absent (Lawrence, 2007). Also, two important
sectors that are globally responsible for a substantial amount of emissions have no
task force assigned to them in the APP. The two sectors are agriculture and trans-
portation, responsible for 13.5% and 13.1% respectively of global greenhouse gas
emissions (IPCC, 2007b). de Coninck et al. (2008) note that they expect effective-
ness to be low given current the small budget allocated to the initiative. The US has
promised US$ 65 million for its first year of operation (Lawrence, 2009). Australia
had promised US$ 150 million over the next 5 years (Lawrence, 2007) and recently
reduced this to US$ 100 million per year (Lawrence, 2009)). Compared to the actual
need for investment of US$ 10-100 billion annually this sum seems meagre (Haege-
stand and Skjaerseth, 2009), even more so when considering that the members of
the APP are responsible for more than 50% of global emissions. In the Montreal
protocol developed countries had an obligation via a certain formula to pay for the
incremental cost of developing countries for acceding to the agreement. In the case
of the APP this is voluntary and the outcome seems to be disappointing.
2.4.3 Outcomes from recent Conference of Party Meetings
During the Conference of the Parties Meeting (COP) in Cancun meeting in Decem-
ber 2010, it was decided to create a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) and a
Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN). The TEC Panel of experts will
consist of 11 developed country and 9 developing country experts, which are re-
sponsible for “identifying technology needs and priorities, coordinating efforts, and
providing recommendations for improvement”3. CTCN,” . . . consisting of a centre
and a large network, will serve an operative role in technology transfer on an inter-
national to regional scale. It will function mainly to carry out the TEC’s directives,
2http://www.asiapacificpartnership.org/english/about.aspx
3http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/post/cancun-agreements-on-technology-transfer/
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as well as to facilitate and improve upon existing initiatives.”4 Furthermore, a Green
Climate Fund (GCF) was established with equal representations from developed and
developing countries5. This fund should raise 100 billion $ per year by 2020. During
its initial period it will be governed by the World Bank, afterwards by the UN. At
COP 17 in Durban in December 2011, it was decided to extend the Kyoto Protocol
for a second commitment period until 2017 or 2020, depending on the speed of the
negotiation process for a new agreement, which is supposed to be finalised by 2015.
Also, the operational details of the TEC and CTCN were finalised and both are
expected to become fully operational in 2012. Furthermore, the GCF was formally
launched: “The Fund will contribute to the achievement of the ultimate objective
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In
the context of sustainable development, the Fund will promote the paradigm shift
towards low-emission and climate-resilient development pathways by providing sup-
port to developing countries to limit or reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to
adapt to the impacts of climate change, taking into account the needs of those de-
veloping countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”6.
The host country of the GCF secretariat and further operational details are sched-
uled to be worked out and decided upon by the end of 2012. However, it is still not
clear where the money for the fund is supposed to come from which remains the
largest obstacle for a fully operational GCF (Padma et al., 2011). Additionally, it
is not clear how and if at all the GCF would be linked with the TEC and CTCN.
If sufficient funding can be raised for the GCF and it is institutionally connected
with the TEC and CTCN, this would represent a significant improvement to current
approaches. Finally, it is not clear how the fund and technology transfer would be
integrated into emission markets, if a new agreement emerges. As argued above,
this is a vital step for an effective climate change agreement.
2.5 Green Technology Bank
The GTB is based on the idea advanced by Barrett (2001, 2003) and Benedick
(2001, 2007) that a global agreement to curb emissions should be more technology-
centred. Their approach focuses on the operational details of R&D funding and tech-
nology standards whereas the question of technology transfer was mentioned only
briefly. The GTB also shares some elements with the technology CDM (tCDM)
by Teng et al. (Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements Discussion
Paper,2008). The most crucial difference between the tCDM and the GTB is the
4http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/post/cancun-agreements-on-technology-transfer/
5http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_releases_and_advisories/
application\newline/pdf/pr_20101211_cop16\_closing.pdf
6http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdfpage=55
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underlying assumption that developing countries do not face emission ceilings un-
der the tCDM. Common to both proposals is their requirement that technology
transfer must be part of any emission credit transfer, which is absent in the CDM
in its current form. Without this requirement there is a serious risk of energy in-
frastructure being “...locked-in” to a carbon intensive mode.”(Teng et al., Harvard
Project on International Climate Agreements Discussion Paper,2008, p.7). Fur-
thermore, the tCDM will only grant a transfer of emission rights, if the transfer
of technology is in line with goals of the developing country government, such as
“installation of transferred technology, or a cost reduction goal, or a local content
goal.” Teng et al. (Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements Discus-
sion Paper,2008). Such restrictions are not part of the GTB. They would be too
exclusive for the mechanism to fulfil its potential in terms of technology transfer
from developed to developing countries.
The GTB addresses the operational details left out by Barrett (2001, 2003) and
Benedick (2001, 2007) concerning technology transfer. It is embedded in a global
agreement with emission limits also for developing countries, a crucial assumption
left out in the Teng et al. (2008) approach. Therefore, it represents an option for
a very different policy scenario than their approach. In comparison to the CDM it
includes a technology transfer dimension previously absent. Finally, in contrast to
the APP it is embedded in a climate change agreement that features emission limits.
2.5.1 Assumptions underlying the GTB
First of all, the assumption is made that technology is a private good that has a
range of positive externalities. Technology here is first and foremost considered to
be technical apparatus. The soft-skills that come with it, such as better technical
knowledge fall under the category of externalities, as well as ancillary benefits. Sec-
ondly, it is assumed that in the foreseeable future there will be no global permit
market but rather several regional permit markets that are imperfectly linked. Fur-
thermore, these regional permit markets will not be perfect in the sense that not
all sectors of the economy will be regulated by emission caps or taxes, especially in
developing countries. One implication of this is different abatement cost levels in
different regions of the world, leaving room for a side-payment mechanism. Finally,
as the GTB is to operate under a climate change agreement that imposes emission
limits on developed as well as on developing countries, any permit transfer that takes
place will be a zero sum game in terms of global total emissions. If a transfer takes
place, one country will have to give up emission permits in order for the transacting
partner to acquire them.
The assumption of one or several regional agreements and the establishment
of emission markets by developing countries might not be observed now or in the
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coming years. Therefore, the following analysis is first and foremost a theoretical
exercise applicable in the circumstances assumed, rather than an option for the
current policy situation. However, developing countries will have to follow a lower
emission path then industrialized countries did, even if a global agreement is un-
likely to emerge anytime soon in order to reduce the likelihood of drastic climate
change (Roegeberg et al., 2010). Otherwise, it will be highly unlikely that emissions
can be lowered enough globally to fulfil the two degree target. This necessity in
combination with concessions required by developed countries can result in sectoral
or regional limits for developing countries making linkage of emission markets with
technology transfer a viable option (Pizer, Harvard Project on International Climate
Agreements Discussion Paper, 2008; Rose and Wei, 2008).
2.5.2 Informational basis and governance
Under the GTB, developed countries are to establish a database containing infor-
mation about green-technologies available from the public and the private sector
in developed and developing countries. This database would be accessible to all
actors for free, making information about the availability of green-technology acces-
sible essentially for free. The actual construction plans would still be protected by
patents. Therefore, the database would not contain proprietary information. The
goal of the database is to create a common platform that is widely known and ac-
cepted in order to provide up-to-date information in the field of green-technologies
to reduce the search costs for the private and public sector in both developed and
developing countries. Developed countries should bear the financial responsibility
for setting up the operation. Public and private research institutes as well as firms
and governments from both developing and developed countries can contribute to
the database. The information provided in the database can be accessed by firms,
research institutions and governments from both developed and developing coun-
tries for free. These actors can use the information to identify technologies that are
suitable for projects they are about to undertake.
An organisation that is well placed to provide such a service the recently founded
International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA): ”...IRENA will facilitate access
to all relevant renewable energy information, including technical data, economic data
and renewable resource potential data. IRENA will share experiences on best prac-
tices and lessons learned regarding policy frameworks, capacity-building projects,
available finance mechanisms and renewable energy related energy efficiency mea-
sures”7. Most of the financial funds IRENA receives come from developed countries,
but a sizeable number of developing countries are also financing members, ensuring
7http://www.irena.org/ourMission/index.aspx?mnu=mis
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the necessary expertise to identify technologies suitable to local circumstances in
developing countries.
2.5.3 The mechanism
A company sells green-technology to company in a developing country. The govern-
ment of the company that buys the technology either buys the emission rights from
the buying company if it is subject to emission caps, or buys them in the regional
emission market if a company is not subject to emission caps. The government of
the company that sells the technology then buys these emission credits from the
other government and transfers them to the company that sold the technology. The
emission permits received by the selling company can now be used in the regional
market of that company to either lower their abatement requirement, or to sell them
in the market. These emission permits can only be used in the regional market of
the selling company. The opportunity to sell emission credits in the regional permit
market is crucial since it allows selling companies that are not regulated by emis-
sion caps to gain from increasing R&D into green-technology. Figure 2.1 and 2.2
illustrate the transfer for regulated and non-regulated companies.
Figure 2.1: Technology Transfer among companies subject to emission caps
Technology that is already easily accessible in the buying country should be ex-
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cluded from the scheme, as in the tCDM. How many emission credits are transferred
depends on the evaluation of the amount of emissions that have been avoided com-
pared to the Business-As-Usual case (BAU). An exact determination of how many
emissions were avoided could be carried out by similar institutions as the ones that
are currently responsible for this task under the CDM. Governments are involved
to ensure a smooth transfer of emissions rights on an international level. These
tasks could as well be delegated to IRENA, the United Nations Environmental Pro-
gram (UNEP) or the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). It should be emphasized here that despite the involvement of the gov-
ernment the incentives are set in such a way that they especially aim at increasing
technology transfer activity originating from the private sector.
Figure 2.2: Technology Transfer among companies not subject to emission caps
Due to the permit transfer the price of emission rights in the regional market of
the technology buying countries will increase since supply is reduced. However, the
assumption is made here that the level of the price increase will not be substantial
enough to offset the benefit of a decreased price of green-technology. The price
in the selling countries is likely to fall, since the amount of permits in the market
increases.
A regular evaluation should take place if the emission credit transfer alone is
enough to induce sufficient R&D in green-technology. If this is not the case, then
the developed country government should consider providing subsidies in addition
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to emission credits. The group of people that carry out such an evaluation should
be comprised of developed and developing countries experts. Again, IRENA and its
centre for innovation and technology, but also the UNEP or the UNFCCC would be
suitable candidates for this task
2.5.4 Evaluation of the GTB
We evaluate the GTB by a set of criteria common in the literature for TOA: Environ-
mental effectiveness, technological effectiveness, economic efficiency, incentives for
participation and administrative feasibility. Environmental effectiveness evaluates
how effective a mechanism reduces CO2 emissions and what kind of policy certainty
it provides to participating factions. In terms of CO2 reductions the GTB does
not change the total amount of allowed emission in the developed world which is
governed by local Emission Trading Systems (ETS). However, it should increase the
incentive for developing countries to participate in a new climate change agreement
that stipulates emission limits for them. Naming a specific number of additional
CO2 reductions which could be attributed to the GTB would be too speculative
at this point in our opinion. Much depends on the negotiation process which has
proven to be highly uncertain. Concerning predictability, CDM projects throughout
the last years often suffered from delays and non-issuance, due to baseline method-
ology disputes (Bakker et al., 2011b; Cormier and Bellassen, CDC Climat Research
Working Paper, 2012). This would be a problem for the GTB as well, but this
issue would be a problem for any kind of TOA that involves sustainable emission
reductions as a goal, which require a baseline definition. A TOA is considered as
technological effective if it advances science and technology, taking into account the
kind of technology it focuses on. The GTB’s focuses on marketable technology and
providing better information about it worldwide. In both areas, it could lead to
a significant improvement of the knowledge and application of environmental tech-
nology in developing countries. In the medium- to long-term the GTB can lead
to an increase in green R&D focused on applications in developing countries. This
increase in R&D activity would not only be observed in the developed world, but
also in developing countries since the influx of environmental technology can be ex-
pected to lead to an increase in technological capabilities and learning as argued
above. Concerning economic efficiency, the GTB does not prescribe the type of
technology that is supposed to be used. This is left for the involved companies to
decide. However, the GTB does have sustainability requirements on the technology
involved. We consider this is as a necessary condition for an environmentally sound
TOA. Concerning administrative feasibility IRENA, UNEP, and the UNFCCC were
mentioned. Also, the recently established CTCN and TEC should play an important
role in administrating the mechanism. Combined, these institutions have the experi-
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ence and international reach to successfully manage the GTB. Also, many developed
country governments have had experience with emission trading and are also in a
good position to facilitate the required emission permit exchange and consult de-
veloping country governments to set up their own ETS. The following sub-sections
describe the incentives for buying and selling companies, and for governments to
participate in the GTB.
2.5.5 Incentives for technology buying companies
Buying companies subject to tradable emission caps can now obtain technology
at a lower price than before. This is due to the standard tax/subsidy incidence.
Furthermore, buying companies that are not subject to emission caps receive an
actual subsidy besides the decrease in the price of technology. The money paid
by the selling company’s government for the emission credits will be transferred
to them. Since non-regulated companies do not have the same “pull” incentive
(Lawrence, 2007) to adopt green-technology as their regulated peers, an additional
incentive to do so is important. Companies in developing countries which do not
accept emission limits under a new climate change agreement will not be able to
profit from the GTB. Therefore, companies should have an interest in pressuring
their respective government to join the agreement in order to gain access to green-
technology via GTB, as it reduces their cost of operation and offers them technology
that might otherwise be hard to come by.
2.5.6 Incentives for technology selling companies
Both types of companies, those subject to an emission limit and those not subject
to emission limits, receive a subsidy from their government in form of emission
credits. It is crucial to realize that non-regulated companies also receive a subsidy
since they can sell the emission rights that they receive through the transfer in the
regional emission market. Otherwise, they would have no added incentive for green
technology R&D applicable in developing countries. Both companies still receive
the normal price for their technology; the subsidy in form of emission permits is
additional. Finally, The more known the GTB is in buying countries, the more
beneficial participation will be as developed and developing country entrepreneurs
will use it as a standard tool to find and offer green-technologies. This has the
potential to reduce marketing and search costs for both sides.
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2.5.7 Incentives for governments
Developing country governments profit through extensive ancillary benefits as de-
scribed above. Furthermore, they profit through the establishment of permit mar-
kets by gaining an additional revenue source in the medium-term. Developed country
governments lessen the burden on their companies by giving them cheaper abate-
ment options. On the cost side they bear the main financial burden for the mech-
anism. All governments profit from reducing the chances of drastic climate change
by reducing emissions globally.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper evaluated a new technology transfer mechanism as part of a new climate
change agreement that involves emission limits for both developed and developing
countries under the assumption of regional emission markets. Several insufficiencies
of current climate change agreements concerning the effective transfer of technology
were addressed. The Kyoto Protocol has no effective technology transfer mechanism
and major developing and developed country polluters are not part of the agreement.
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) suffers from range of disadvantageous
economic incentives that may even lead to more emissions. The Asia-Pacific Part-
nership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) features no emission limits re-
ducing the “pull” incentive to adopt green-technology considerably. The funding
of the agreement has been meagre so far. The sectoral approach concerning the
development and transfer of technologies deserves credit and can serve as an input
for the development of a more effective technology transfer scheme. An important
actor that both the Kyoto Protocol and the APP fail to include through economic
incentives at a sufficient scale is the private sector. Without the inclusion of this
sector and its R&D capacity, it is unlikely that sufficient transfer of technology will
materialize. Current discussions in Cancun and Durban led to the establishment of
the Technology Executive Committee, a Climate Technology Centre and Network
committee and the Green Climate Fund, which is supposed to reach a volume of 100
US$ billion by 2020, funding abatement and mitigation activities. The origin of the
funding is still not clear. Furthermore, it is not clear how these newly established
mechanisms will operate within the framework of separated emission markets.
Based on the need to include a more technology transfer centred element in a
new climate change agreement we proposed a new technology transfer mechanism,
which we labelled Green Technology Bank (GTB). Developed countries are to es-
tablish a database containing information about green-technologies available from
the public and the private sector in developed and developing countries. Developing
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countries are required to establish emission markets with binding limits in order to
be part of the mechanism. Emission permits from developing countries are used to
subsidise technology transfers from the developed world. Developed country gov-
ernments would compensate developing country companies for transferring permits
to developed country companies.
We evaluated the GTB according to the following criteria: Environmental ef-
fectiveness, technological effectiveness, economic efficiency, incentives for participa-
tion and compliance, and administrative feasibility. The GTB achieves additional
emission reduction compared to other technology-oriented agreements by requiring
developed countries to accept emission limits, making it environmentally more ef-
fective. However, this requirement makes the implementation of the mechanism
more problematic since no developing country has accepted an emission limit up
until now. Nevertheless, we consider this to be a necessary requirement since oth-
erwise a TOA might actually lead to more emissions. Concerning technological
effectiveness, marketable green-technology is the primary technology targeted. In
the medium- to long-run R&D directed towards green-technology suitable for devel-
oping country conditions is likely to increase as well. Involved companies are free
to pick the technology they want to employ if it has been approved by the GTB
under the conditions described above. Therefore, keeping the sustainability and
additionally criteria in mind the GTB can be considered as economically efficient
and cost-effective. Concerning incentives for participation, companies in developed
countries receive subsidies for technology transfer and a lower permit price due to
the influx of permits from developing countries. Companies in developing countries
receive otherwise hard to come by technology but face higher emission prices. De-
veloped and developing country governments reduce the chance of drastic climate
change by agreeing to a solution, in which developing countries accept emission lim-
its. Developed countries pay for the mechanism, but considering the establishment
of the GCF and the proposed financial backing a willingness to pay seems to there.
Developed country governments profit from ancillary benefits and revenues from the
emission markets.
Further research on this issue should aim at answering questions related to
product piracy, potential negative effects of technology, an empirical estimation
of avoided emissions, the political feasibility of such a scheme considering recent
developments, and how to integrate such an approach with official development aid
efforts.
22
Chapter 3
The Clean-Development
Mechanism, Stochastic Permit
Prices and Energy Investments
3.1 Introduction
Negotiations to reach a legally binding international agreement to combat climate
change are on stalemate and proposals to postpone the final deadline to reach an
agreement in 2015 have been put forward (Kossoy and Guigon, 2013). However,
despite of the slow pace of international negotiations, several countries are planning
to set up their own cap-and-trade based Emission Trading Schemes (ETS) in the
near future. These include Australia, China and Korea (Kossoy and Guigon, 2013).
Thus, the question of how these markets will interact with each other and how
the baseline-credit-schemes such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) will
continue to function in such a setting is of great importance. Besides the CDM
the Joint Implementation Mechanism (JI) is another flexible mechanisms based on
provisions in the Kyoto Protocol. A program that is likely to join their ranks in
the foreseeable future is the United Nations Collaborative Initiative on Reducing
Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD).
Uncertainty about a future climate change agreement and the way ETS markets
are going to interact will have a major influence on future profit stream of energy
companies. Furthermore, investment in the energy sector is generally considered
as irreversible. Combining uncertainty and irreversibility with the possibility of
waiting for new information to make a better informed decision, renders this problem
suitable for an uncertainty analysis framework in the spirit of real-options analysis.
This method is superior to calculating net present value (NPV) in such a situation,
since the investor can take into account future realizations of the parameters that
influence profitability, allowing him to optimally time the investment decision. An
NPV analysis assigns a probability to these outcomes, but is not able to consider
future market realizations, and react in a flexible manner to these. Since it does
not take into account the flexibility dimension, it is also likely to yield a lower
value of the investment project compared to the real-options approach. After the
original development of financial options valuation by Black and Scholes (1973) and
Merton (1973), their techniques were adopted for real-investments in the physical
sense by Myers (1977). Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeoris (1996) provide a
good overview with numerous examples. One of the first adoptions to the energy
sector was undertaken by Herbelot (1992). Analyzing the decision of a coal-power
plant owner to install a scrubber to fulfill sulfur emissions limits, he finds that
the net present value (NPV) increases substantially when the owner can decide
flexibly when to start investing, due to the value of additional information. Insley
(2003) investigates the same problem and finds that the low level of emission prices
since 1993 led to few investment decision in favor of scrubbers, while the preferred
method of compliance was switching to a low-sulfur coal type. The option to halt
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construction at any point played pivotal role in the investment decision. Yang et al.
(2008) investigate the impact of uncertain emission prices on the risk associated with
investing either into a coal, gas or nuclear plant. They find that the degree of the
investment risk caused by uncertain permit prices depends to a large degree on the
merit-order of energy production, being lowest when gas or nuclear plants are first.
Furthermore, including the possibility of price shocks, policy makers should try to
let them happen as seldom as possible since investment will stagnate while waiting
for new information on prices to be revealed. In contrast, Fuss et al. (2009) consider
the case when a company can invest into a fossil, a carbon-capture and storage
(CCS) module, and/or a renewable power plant. The owner is flexible with respect
to the timing of investment and permit prices evolve stochastically. They find that
when evaluating these options simultaneously, the option to retrofit the fossil plant
with CCS leads to a postponement of the investment into renewable energy. Also,
when considering the timing of climate policy they find that longer periods between
jumps in prices lead to less emissions. Fuss et al. (2010) consider the impact of
options on emission permits that are derived from REDD on energy investments.
They find that REDD options may leave investment in carbon capture and storage
technology (CCS) unaffected if they are priced as derivatives of CO2 permits, since
this would ensure a high enough price. However, one should not forget that CCS
will remain a non-viable technology option for the medium-term future, and testing
has even been banned in some countries 1.
Studies that investigate the impact of the CDM on the option value of a gas
power plant with a simultaneous renewable investment option under uncertainty in
the developed world are largely absent in the literature. Some publications address
the issue on a qualitative level2, while others address the issue on a Computable Gen-
eral Equilibrium level that does not incorporate the uncertainty dimension (Anger
et al., 2008). However, as mentioned before new cap-and-trade emission markets
are emerging world wide and without an overarching structure of a global climate
agreement, baseline-credit-markets such as the CDM will continue to play a role.
Without a good understanding of how the interaction between these two markets
influence the investment decisions of energy companies, it is not clear ex-ante that
they will help to transform the energy infrastructure and strengthen sustainable
1http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Wie-ein-Ausweg-zur-Sackgasse-wurde-article4376091.
html
2See for example (Blanco and Rodrigues, 2008, p.1517):”However, the low price of CERs and
ERUs (Emission Reduction Units) on the EU ETS market can play an indirect negative role on
wind energy and other technologies since their inflow to the EU ETS market further reduces the
allowance prices in Europe and with them the little incentive that remains to invest in-house. An
industry obliged to cut its emissions would prefer to import cheap JI or CDM credits instead of
buying EU ETS credits or adapting its production process.”.
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development, which are the two foremost goals of the CDM3.
The contribution of this paper is to analyze the impact that the simultaneous
availability of the two permit classes with differing price developments, one from
a cap-and-trade scheme and one from a baseline-credit-scheme, has on the option
value to invest into a gas power plant, or a renewable alternative. We use the EU
ETS as an example for a cap-and-trade scheme and the CDM as an example of
baseline-credit scheme, since these are the dominant permit classes at the moment.
We take the perspective of a government asking the following questions:
 What is the probability that in t years the value of the option to build a
gas plant is larger than investing into a wind power plant under permit price
uncertainty?
 What is the impact of being able to use permits originating from the Clean
Development Mechanism on this probability?
The answer to the first question allows the government to evaluate if a policy
environment leads investors to build wind power plants now, or if companies are
willing to postpone their investment and choose gas power due to the option value
of fossil energy. If it is the goal of a government to promote renewable energy
investment, taking into account the option value of fossil energy is very important
since this might significantly prolong a fossil based energy structure. Answering
the second question then helps to evaluate the impact of different permit classes
on investment behavior, which is of importance as more and more permit markets
with different price developments paths emerge around the world and are likely to
be linked in the future.
In order to answer these questions, we employ a simplified real options framework
where a single investor compares the option value to invest into a gas power plant to
investing into a wind power plant. The uncertainty a gas plant faces stems from the
price development of the two permit classes which are described by two geometric
Brownian Motions (gBM). Since the wind power plant does not produce any CO2
emissions, it can be considered as risk free with respect to permit costs, and no
option value is calculated for this energy type. For given permit prices the value
of the option to build a gas power plant are calculated. We then determine the
probability of the following event at time t: An investor facing the choice between
the gas power plant option and building a wind power plant, chooses the gas plant
option. Furthermore, the impact of increasing or decreasing the quota of sCER
3”The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included
in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective
of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3” - http://unfccc.int/
essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php
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permits a company can use is simulated. Finally, we perform a range of sensitivity
checks with respect to the interest rate, the trend of the gBM, volatility of permit
prices and the correlation between the two process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces briefly the
most important background issues, the CDM, the carbon market and the behavior
of emission prices analyzed in the literature. In Section 3 the model is described,
including the price-processes of the two permit classes. Section 4 contains the data
information used in the model, concerning energy markets, the power plants, and
the price processes. In Section 5 we present and discuss the results of our model,
and draw policy conclusions. In section 6 we conclude.
3.2 A short history of the carbon market an the
CDM
3.2.1 The Carbon Market
The carbon market is largely dominated by European ETS transactions, being cur-
rently the only large scale mandatory ETS market in operation worldwide. The
overall volume and the importance of the CDM have been growing steadily, coming
to a halt in 2009 due to the uncertainty over a new climate change agreement. With
a total value of 141.9 $ billion dollars in 2010, the European ETS represented 82%
of the market volume and the CDM 14% (Linacre et al., 2011). There are two asset
classes pertaining to the CDM. The first is primary Certified Emission Reductions
(pCER). These are credits that are obtained directly from projects. The second
class, secondary Certified Emission Reductions (sCER), are resold pCER. The main
difference between the two pertains to delivery risk. sCER do not have a delivery
risk, since they have been delivered already. However, this is a major issue with
pCER. Regulations concerning what projects are CDM eligible change frequently
and might discontinue an already existing permit flow (Bakker et al., 2011a; Klep-
per, 2011). Therefore, it is uncertain if pCER will eventually be generated from a
project. Despite the fact that they have already been delivered, the delivery risk
of pCER does carry on to sCER in that without a constant stream of new permits
from CDM projects, the market will eventually become illiquid thus influencing the
sCER price (Linacre et al., 2011; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011).
3.2.2 The CDM
The CDM gives developed countries flexibility in achieving their emission targets
and should lower their compliance cost, since abatement activities carried out in
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developing countries are considerably cheaper (Castro, 2010; Bakker et al., 2011a).
The CDM operates as follows: Companies can invest into projects in developing
countries, receiving the emission saved due to their involvement as emission permits.
In order to establish the amount of emissions that were saved due to the involvement
of the developed country firm, a baseline is established estimating the business-as-
usual emissions. Therefore, the CDM is also called a basline-and-credit scheme. The
credits in form of emission permits a company obtains in this way, can then be used
in their regional ETS to fulfill their own abatement requirements or can be re-sold
in the market. Projects should only fall under the CDM if they would not have been
carried out without CDM support, and additional emission savings are generated
due to the CDM involvement (Zavodov, 2010). This is known as the additionality
criterion. CDM projects do not need to have a technology transfer component.
A study by Seres et al. (2009) finds that about 36% of all CDM projects have a
technology transfer component. There is a limit on how many CDM permits can
be used for abatement in the European ETS. This limit is set at 13,4% of the total
of allowed emissions for Phase II, which runs from 2008-2012 (Kossoy and Ambrosi,
2011).
The CDM has been subject to a variety of criticism over the years. One main
line of criticism concerns the additionality criterion. Often, projects that would
have gone ahead without the CDM were reported in such a way to make them CDM
conform (Wara, 2008a; Bakker et al., 2011a). This in turn led to an oversupply of
CDM credits and consequently depressed emission prices. Other criticism concerns
its actual contribution to sustainable development, the lack of technology transfer,
the distribution of projects world wide (95% in Asia and Latin America), and the
level of transaction cost involved in getting a project approved (Bakker et al., 2011a).
How and if these criticisms will be incorporated into a post-2012 climate change
agreement is not clear at the moment. However,”. . . the CDM will last well into the
post-Kyoto phase, since the majority of projects already approved will lead to the
issuance of CERs (permits) for many years to come” (Klepper, 2011, p.696)
3.2.3 Emission Prices
One European Emission Allowances (EUA) and one sCER can be used to abate the
same amount of CO2. Therefore, they should theoretically have the same value.
However, this is not the case. Since the CDM became operational in 2007 and the
establishment of its different asset classes in the market, a spread existed between
sCER and EUA allowance prices. This spread can be linked to the political un-
certainty that has constantly threatened the functioning of the CDM market. The
future of the CDM has often not been clear and the approval process of credits has
undergone frequent changes, so that investors do not perceive this permit class as
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an equivalent of EUA permits (Mizrach, 2012). This uncertainty is likely to persist
in the coming years, which implies that the spread will continue to exist (Bellassen
and Leguet, 2012).
Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2011) investigate the drivers of this spread and find the
following factors to be the most influential: Linking the CDM with other ETS, the
EUA price, the financial crisis, and the volume of EUA and sCER traded. Linking
with other ETS markets is an important issue since demand for permits originating
from the CDM would increase, thereby decreasing the reliance of CDM projects
on the European ETS market. With the current quota, liquidity is limited on the
market (Nazifi, 2011). The spread is also driven by the EUA-Price since this sets
effectively the upper limit for sCER prices. If the price of the sCER were to surpass
the EUA price, it would make no sense for an investor to buy these unless there were
no more EUA available on the market. Since industrial production was significantly
lowered during the financial crisis, less emissions were produced and consequently
also less permits required. This led to a significant over-supply of EUA and this
brought the sCER and EUA price closer together. Finally, the volume of trading
points to the fact, ”...that the EUA-sCER spread maybe used as a ’speculative’
instrument by rational investors and market participants on the EU ETS, who are
able to trade simultaneously EUAs and sCERs when the price difference is large
enough to justify the arbitrage activities” (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011, p.1067).
3.3 Model Description
3.3.1 Price-processes
In our model we will focus on the impact of EUA and sCER on energy investments.
We exclude pCER from our analysis for three reasons: First of all, there is no
common pCER price since each project has an individual risk class and therefore an
individual price (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011). This would force us to include a
stochastic process for every project type, which would render the model intractable.
Secondly, including pCER would also imply that we would have to include the
decision to invest into a CDM project. We will not pursue this modeling approach,
since there are many firms in the market that are not able to develop CDM projects,
but are subject to emission limits and rely on the sCER market. Finally, pCER
transactions do not play a significant role in the current market situation and are
unlikely to play a major role within the next five years.
We assume that prices for EUA and sCER allowances follow stochastic processes.
For EUA prices we follow current results in the literature that attempt to model their
price development (Yang et al., 2008; Fuss et al., 2008, 2009, 2010), by assuming the
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price development to follow a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with a positive
trend. The basic reason for using GBM to model the price process, is that it is
generally expected that prices for allowances will reach a higher long-term price
than the current one, despite possible price reductions from time to time. The goal
of a long-term higher price stems from clearly formulated political will to achieve a
relatively carbon free economy in the long-term in order to limit severe consequences
of global warming. For the sCER price we also assume a GBM with a positive
trend. A more detailed discussion concerning the sCER price process specification
will follow in section 4.2.
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and let W1,t and W2,t be Wiener processes
with respect to a probability measure P with correlation ρ < 1. Let (Ft)t be the
filtration generated by W1,t and W2,t. The price processes P1,t and P2,t are described
by the following equation:
dPi,t
Pi,t
= µidt+ σidWi,t. (3.3.1)
Hence Pi,t is a stochastic processes following a GBM, where i = 1, 2. Here P1,t
models the price process for EUA and P2,t the price process for sCER. Here µi is
the drift parameter, σi the volatility parameter. In such a situation, an equivalent
martingale measure exists which we denote by Q 4. Under this probability measure
the two price processes discounted by the risk-free interested rf are martingales.
We assumed W1,t and W2,t to be correlated because the EUA prices have a
positive influence on sCER prices (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011). The intuition
for this influence is as follows: An increase in the price of EUA will increase interest
in buying sCER allowances due to their now relative lower price, assuming that the
quota for sCER allowances has not been reached yet. This will drive up the sCER
price and therefore we expect the correlation to be positive.
3.3.2 Profit function and investment options
An investor can choose between pursuing an investment project in gas or wind
power, by comparing the real-option value of the gas plant, with that of a wind
power which does not face uncertainty. By considering the real-option value and
not the NPV value, the investor can take into account the effect of the realization
of future permit prices. Since the investment can be postponed, taking account of
these realizations will render a gas power investment more profitable as compared
to the NPV approach. This will give the government a better informed analysis
4see Shreve (2004) for details
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concerning the effect of a policy framework on investment behavior. For simplicity,
we assume that both power plants have the same life time of 30 years, denoted by
T . Capital used for the construction of one type of plant cannot be used for the
construction of the other or resold, thereby making the investment irreversible. The
wind power plant is emission free and receives a subsidy in form of a premium on
the electricity price for its production. This renewable subsidy simulates a feed-in
tariff system, which is a common support system for renewables in many countries.
If the gas plant is built, a company needs to comply with emission regulations.
We assume that this will be done by acquiring sCER and EUA emission permits.
As described above, there is a maximum limit imposed on the amount of sCER
that can be used for abatement. We assume that if emission permits need to be
purchased, a company will use the maximum quota of sCER, and buy EUA to
fulfill the rest. This assumption is based on empirical results that companies that
are involved in the CDM market are using their full CDM quota (Hermann et al.,
2010). As on of the main purposes of the CDM is to reduce the abatement cost of
developed countries, and sCER prices are lower and likely to remain so (Mizrach,
2012; Bellassen and Leguet, 2012), this behavior can be expected. Furthermore, this
assumption makes the model considerably more tractable and numerically easier to
handle than allowing a continuous choice model. Since the empirical evidence points
to the fact the full quota is used, we are convinced that even with this assumption
our model can generate valuable insides concerning the impact of permit classes on
investment behavior. The sCER price can surpass the EUA price in our model. This
assumption is only used to keep the computational complexity manageable. This is
a limitation of our model, but we believe it does not overly limit the conclusions we
derive from this model.
The question we seek to answer is: At time 0, what is the probability that an
investor prefers the gas plant over the wind plant investment? In order to answer
this question we look at the profit functions of the power plants, which are defined
as follows: For both plants, let
 q be the amount of electricity produced,
 ce be the price of electricity and
 rf be the risk-free interest rate,
For the wind plant, let
 Vw,year be the yearly profit of the plant,
 sw be the subsidy the wind plant receives for the electricity produced
 rw be the risk-adjusted interest rate for the plant,
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 Cw be the construction costs,
 OCw be the operation costs per unit of electricity produced,
where Vw,year = q(ce + sw−OCw). Then the present value at time t0 of a wind plant
built at t0 is,
Vw =
t0+T∑
t=t0+1
Vw,year
(1 + rw)t−t0
− Cw =
T∑
t=1
Vw,year
(1 + rw)t
− Cw.
Note that Vw is independent of t0, P1 and P2.
For the gas plant, let
 V −g,year be the yearly profit of the plant, if permits prices are not considered,
 rg be the risk-adjusted interest rate of the plant except for the permit costs,
 n be the number of permits needed per year,
 p be the percentage of sCER permits,
 Cg be the construction costs.
 OCg be the operation costs per unit of electricity produced,
 cg be the fuel cost for gas per unit of electricity produced,
where V −g,year = q(ce − cg −OCg). Then,
Proposition 1. The present value Vg at time t0 of a gas plant built at time t0 is,
V −g − nT ((1− p)P1,t0 − pP2,t0),
where
V −g :=
[ T∑
t=1
V −g,year
(1 + rg)t
]− Cg.
Proof. Let F1,t and F2,t be the futures price of a EUA permit and a sCER permit
at t0 with delivery date t. Then
Vg =
[ t0+T∑
t=t0+1
V −g,year
(1 + rg)t−t0
− n((1− p)F1,t + pF2,t)
(1 + rf )t−t0
]− Cg.
The first summand
V −g,year
(1+rg)t−t0
is the yearly profit of the gas power plant, if permit
prices are not considered, discounted by the risk-adjusted interest rate. The second
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summand n((1−p)F1,t+pF2,t)
(1+rf )
t−t0 are the discounted permit costs, that is the value at t0 of
the obligation to buy a permit at time t. In the absence of arbitrage this value is
precisely the futures price at t0 with delivery t discounted by the risk-free interest
rate. The future prices are given by Fi,t = Pi,t0(1 + rf )
t−t0 (for example, see Hull
(2009) Chapter 5). We get
Vg =
[ T∑
t=1
V −g,year
(1 + rg)t
− n((1− p)P1,t0 − pP2,t0)
]− Cg
= V −g − nT ((1− p)P1,t0 − pP2,t0),
Note that Vg depends on P1,t0 and P2,t0 , but not on t0 itself. We will sometimes
write Vg(P1,t0 , P2,t0) to indicate this dependency.
For the precise values of the variables defined above such as the operation costs and
energy prices, we refer the reader to Section 3.4.1.
3.3.3 The value of a gas power plant option
We now value the following gas plant investment option. Let L be natural number.
Each year, beginning at time t0, the investor can decide whether or not build one.
Once the gas plant is built, the investor has no further option. If the plant is built,
it has to be built within L years. So if the option is exercised, it has to be exercised
by time t0 + L. We denote the value of this option at time t, where t0 ≤ t ≤ t0 + L
by Vo,t. If the plants has not been built at time t and t < t0 + L, the value of the
option is given by
Vo,t(P1,t, P2,t) = max{EQ[ Vo,t+1
(1 + rf )
|Ft](P1,t, P2,t), Vg(P1,t, P2,t)}. (3.3.2)
On the right hand side of the above equation, EQ[
Vo,t+1
(1+rf )
|Ft] is the continuation value,
that is the expected value of the option at time t + 1 under equivalent martingale
measure Q if the investor does not build the plant at time t. The value Vg(P1,t, P2,t)
is the payoff the investor receives if he decides to build the gas plant at time t. At
time t0 + L, the continuation value is 0, because this is the last time the investor
can decide to build the gas plant. Hence
Vo,t0+L(P1,t0+L, P2,t0+L) = max{Vg(P1,t0+L, P2,t0+L), 0}. (3.3.3)
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We will solve these equations (3.3.2) and (3.3.3) recursively. Again, note that the
value Vo,t0 of the option at time t0 depends on P1,t0 , P2,t0 and L, but not on t0 itself.
In the case that only EUA permits are used, that is p = 0, the above option can
be expressed as a classical American Put option.
Proposition 2. If p = 0, then
Vo,t0 = nT PutAmer(
V −g
nT
, L),
where PutAmer(x, t) is the value of an American Put option on P1 with strike price
x and maturity date t that can be exercise each year.
Proof. If the option to build a gas plant is exercised at time t, the payoff is
V −g − nTP1,t = nT (
V −g
nT
− P1,t)
by Proposition 1. That is the same payoff one receives when exercising nT Put
options with strike price
V −g
nT
.
In Table 3.1 we show the option value for different EUA/sCER price combinations.
Table 3.1: Gas plant value in million dollars (p = 0.15)
EUA \ sCER 2 5 10
2 1087.8 1069 1037.8
5 981.6 962.9 931.6
10 804.7 786 754.7
20 450.9 432.1 400.9
30 97 78.3 47.1
Table 3.1: Gas plant value in million dollars
In figure 3.1 and figure 3.2 we plot the value of Vo,t0 for permit price values ∈ [0, 40].
The plot in figure 3.1 contains the case p = 0, where Vo,t0 just depends on P1,t0 . We
choose L to 30. By Proposition 2 the values can be determined using the algorithm
from Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) for pricing American put options. Of course, we
did not calculate the option value for every possible value of P1,t0 , but determined
the option value for over 1000 different value of P1,t0 between 0 and 80 and then
calculated a best fit curve for those option values. In figure 3.2 we plot the value of
Vo,t0 when p = 0.15. In this situation Vo,t0 depends on both P1,t0 and P2,t0 and we
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calculated the value of Vo,t0 for up to a thousand different pairs of values of P1,t0 and
P2,t0 between 0 and 80. For the calculation of each of these values, we generated 2000
paths for each of the price processes randomly. Given these paths, we then solved
(3.3.2) and (3.3.3) recursively. That means we first determine Vo,t0+L using equation
(3.3.3), and recursively use the already calculated value of Vo,t+1 to determine Vo,t
using (3.3.2). As in the Longstaff and Schwartz algorithm, the continuation value
is determined by a least square approximation.
10 20 30 40
EUA price
5.0´10
8
1.0´10
9
1.5´10
9
2.0´10
9
Life time profit
Wind plant
Gas plant
Figure 3.1: Option Value / EUA only Figure 3.2: Option Value / EUA and
sCER
3.3.4 Investment Probability
We are now interested in the probability at time 0 that at a future time t0 an investor
prefers the gas plant option over building a wind power plant. This happens precisely
when at time t0, Vo,t0(P1,t0 , P2,t0) > Vw. Thus we want to calculate
P(Vo,t0(P1,t0 , P2,t0) > Vw). (3.3.4)
Note that P here is the actual real-world probability measure. It is not the risk-
neutral measure Q. The reason is that we take the point of view of an government
that is trying to determine with what probability an investor makes a certain deci-
sion. We are not trying to determine the risk-neutral value for governments of such
a decision by the investor.
Since Vo,t0 depends only on the values of the two price processes P1,t0 and P2,t0 at
time t0, but not on t0 itself, we do not have to determine the value Vo,t0(P1,t0 , P2,t0)
for each t0 and each possible value of P1,t0 and P2,t0 . Rather it is enough to de-
termine Vo,t0(P1,t0 , P2,t0) for one t0 and each possible value of P1,t0 and P2,t0 . The
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calculation of this option value was discussed in the previous subsection. This allows
use to determine a set C ⊆ R2 such that a pair (x, y) ∈ R2 is in C if and only if
Vo,t0(x, y) > Vw for all possible values of t0. In Figure 3.2, the set C is where the
red plane is above the blue plane.
Hence in order to calculate the probability in (3.3.4), we just need to deter-
mine P((P1,t0 , P2,t0) ∈ C). The following the Proposition gives a formula for this
probability.
Proposition 3. Let t0 > 0. Then
P((P1,t0 , P2,t0) ∈ C) =
1
2pit0
∫
(x,y)∈D
e
− 1
2t0
(x2+y2)
dxdy,
where D is
{(x, y) ∈ R2 : (P1,0e(µ1−
σ21
2
)t+σ1x, P2,0e
(µ2−σ
2
2
2
)t+σ2(ρx+(1−ρ2)1/2y)) ∈ C}
Proof. Let W3,t be another Wiener process with respect to a probability measure P
that is independent of W1,t. Without loss of generality, we can assume that
W2,t = ρW1,t + (1− ρ2)1/2W3,t.
Then the solution of the stochastic differential equations (4.3.2) are
P1,t = P1,0e
(µ1−σ
2
1
2
)t+σ1W1,t
P2,t = P2,0e
(µ2−σ
2
2
2
)t+σ2W2,t
= P2,0e
(µ2−σ
2
2
2
)t+σ2(ρW1,t+(1−ρ2)1/2W3,t)
The equation in the statement of the Proposition now follows immediately from the
fact that W1,t and W3,t are independent and normally distributed with mean 0 and
variance t.
So after C is calculated as described in the previous section, the probability in
Proposition 3 can now be determined using numerical integration.
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Table 3.2: Electricity Generating Cost
CCGT Onshore Wind
Electricity price ($) 81 81
Subsidy ($) 0 27
Generation Capacity (MW) 480 45
Capital cost (overnight cost) ($/kW) 1,068.00 2,348.00
Fuel Cost (US$ /MWh) 36,45 0
O&M ($ /MWh) 4.48 21.92
CO2 emissions (tCO2/MWh) 0.33 0
Load Factor 85% 26%
Lifetime 30 years 25 years
Risk-adjusted rate 4% 4%
Risk-free rate 2% 2%
Source: IEA (2010); EEX (2014)
Table 3.2: Electricity Generating Cost
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Power Plant Data
Table 3.2 lists costs and CO2 emissions of the different power plants
5. These are
derived from ”Projected Costs of Generating Electricity - 2010” (IEA, 2010) and
current market data from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) (EEX, 2014). We
compare a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) with an onshore wind power plant,
since gas is likely to remain more competitive than coal and nuclear power given
current events and costs (Kaplan, 2008). We choose not to consider large offshore
wind power plants since there is currently too little information available on their
cost structure which will experience steep learning curves in the future. In contrast,
onshore wind power has already profited from significant technological progress and
is considered a mature technology. In order to make a comparison possible based
on the above provided data, an investor has to effectively produce 480 MW in our
model, either with a gas or wind power plant6.
We assume that operation & maintenance cost (O&M) as well as capital cost
are deterministic. Since both power plants are mature technologies, it is reasonable
to expect that changes in production and investment costs would occur in a similar
5All e values are converted into $ values at an exchange rate of 1.35 $/e.
6For a gas power plant this implies a required plant size of 565 MW ( 480MW0.85(LoadFactor) ). The
load factor is the average yearly usage of the full capacity of the power plant. A wind power plant
with a capacity of 1,920 MW is required to achieve an effective production of 480 MW. This is
approximately equal to the investment into 1,5 average CCGT or a wind park with approximately
43 on-shore wind mills.
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fashion. Capital cost can be considered as overnight cost, which are the cost that
would apply if the plant could be constructed overnight7. Using overnight costs for
two different types of plants is a valid assumption, if the lead time does not differ
substantially which is the case for wind and gas power (IEA, 2010; Kettunen et al.,
2011).
We assume a deterministic electricity as well as gas price. Construction costs
for either power plant type also remain deterministic throughout the model. We
thereby abstract from inflation on the cost as well as on the revenue side. These
assumptions are made to reduce modeling complexity significantly and to put the
focus on the effect of allowance prices on power plant investments, the foremost
topic of this paper. The assumption of a deterministic electricity price is not un-
common in similar modeling approaches (Laurikka and Koljonen, 2006; Fuss et al.,
2008). Furthermore, it has been shown that changing to a stochastic process would
not lead to significantly different results in similar model approaches (Fuss et al.,
2008). The electricity price is set at 60 e which lies approximately in between the
medium-term baseload and peak market price (EEX, 2014) 8. Renewable energy
currently receives a range of support besides the indirect support of putting a price
on CO2 emission. We choose to incorporate these various form of support via a price
premium for wind energy on the electricity price. Concerning the size of the sub-
sidy, we took the German market as an example. In the German case, on-shore wind
receives initially a very high premium, which can last up to 13 years (Wikipedia,
2014). The premium is then slowly reduced to match market prices. Based on the
current feed-in tariff structure, on-shore wind energy then receives a premium of
approximately 20 e per MWh. In section 5.3, we report the results for different
levels of support. Concerning the deterministic gas price, long-term contracts are
common for gas deliveries and current research estimates a stable mean-reverting
trend for gas prices in Europe (Abadie and Chamorro, 2006; Boogert and de Jong,
2011). Finally, we do not consider technological progress since both power plants
types are mature technologies which we assume to experience similar speed of tech-
nological improvement in the long-term, which leaves the overall investment decision
unaffected.
Since we did not include inflation in our model, we focus on the real risk-free
and risk-adjusted interest rates. In our baseline scenario we assume a 2% risk-free
rate based on yields of 3-months US treasury bills (Siddiqui et al., 2007) and a 4%
7”The overnight cost therefore excludes escalation in equipment, labor, and commodity prices
that could occur during the time a plant is under construction. It also excludes the financing
charges, often referred to as interest during construction (IDC), incurred while the plant is being
built”. (Kaplan, 2008, p.696)
8All data stemming from the EEX website, the electricity, gas and permit prices, were taken
on the 22. January 2014.
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risk-adjusted rate (Kaplan, 2008; IEA, 2010; Kettunen et al., 2011). We assume the
same risk-adjusted rates for both types of power plants since they only reflect the
construction and operation risk. The risk originating from emission permit prices is
priced using no arbitrage arguments. We also run the model with a set of different
interest rates and provide the results as part of our sensitivity checks in section 5.
3.4.2 Permit Prices and volatility
Permit prices are subject to great uncertainties due to the influence of climate policy
which changes frequently. Also, due to the relatively short existence of permit
markets, especially in the case of CDM permits, there is no long-term data available
(Fuss et al., 2010). We take future prices of EUA and sCER as a point of departure
9. In accordance with current literature and modeling, we assume that the trend of
the EUA price is 5% and the volatility 20% (Fuss et al., 2010; Kettunen et al., 2011).
We want to stress again here that the assumption of a 5% trend originates from the
political goal to limit global climate change to 2°C. If carbon markets are used as
the main tool to achieve this goal, a 5% trend generates the necessary incentives to
achieve this.
For the sCER permit class, we assume the same volatility as for the EUA per-
mits, since sCER strongly depend on the EUA market and the political uncertainty
is likely to remain high for both permit classes. Furthermore, we assume in our base-
line scenario that the price spread between the two classes is likely to widen over
time, due to the fundamentally different nature of the market for the two permit
classes. This expectation can be seen in our first scenario configuration, where the
trend of the EUA gBM is 5% and that of the sCER gBM is 3%. We also report the
results for a range of different trend values. The main factors likely to cause this dif-
ferential development are the emergence of new emissions markets worldwide causing
increasing supply and demand and larger liquidity (Nazifi, 2011; Mansanet-Bataller
et al., 2011; Bellassen and Leguet, 2012). The increase in supply and demand is due
to the fact that there is still a large amount of untapped projects which will likely
be picked up by new emission markets evolving around the world at cost similar to
current projects (Castro, 2010; Bakker et al., 2011a). These new emissions markets
will also represent a new source of demand for permits originating from the CDM.
With increasing demand and supply due to new markets, the dependence of the
CDM on the EU ETS will lessen over time, increasing the liquidity of the whole
market (Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2011). The most recent example of this is Aus-
tralia, which expects most of the allowances during the first years of its ETS to be
covered by CDM credits (Fogarty, 2011). Furthermore, it can be expected that the
9EUA:4.45 e; sCER:0.45 eData from http://www.eex.com Date: 22.01.2014
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Table 3.3: Price Process Data
EUA sCER
Trend 5% 3%
Volatility 20% 20%
Starting Price ($) 6 0.6075
Correlation sCER-EUA 0.1-0.9
Table 3.3: Price Process Data
regulations on new ETS markets will tighten slower than on the EU ETS markets.
Therefore, the price increase of those permits is likely to be slower than in the EU
ETS market, which will decouple the price development of sCER from the likely
steeper price increase of EUA permits, leading to an probably even larger spread
between EUA and sCER prices (Bellassen and Leguet, 2012).
As mentioned above, we assume that the sCER and EUA price process are
correlated. Chevallier (2011) tests for correlation in a multivariate GARCH Model.
He finds correlations ranging from 0.01-0.9. Therefore, we use 0.5 for the three
policy scenarios we investigate and perform sensitivity checks for a range of other
values.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Policy Scenarios
In this section, we first present three policy scenarios and their results by calculating
the integral in Proposition 1 using numeral integration in Mathematica. We then
discuss the results and a range sensitivity checks.
In scenario 1 we assume that there will be no significant change in the regulatory
environment. The EU leaves the quota of how many CDM credits can be used at
roughly 15%. The EU ETS market also remains the dominant carbon market in
the world, which means that the degree of correlation between the two prices also
remains high 10. In the second scenario, we assume that the regulation concerning
the amount of CDM permits is loosened by increasing the quota to 30%. The EU
ETS market still remains the main global carbon market and the correlation of
sCER and EUA stays at 0.5. One policy scenario in which the quota would increase
is if new offset mechanisms such as REDD would be introduced into the market.
In order not to reduce the CDM market to a level that would leave it illiquid
10We assume a value of ρ = 0.5
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Figure 3.3: Scenario 1, Correlation = 0.5, sCER Quota:15%
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Figure 3.4: Scenario 2, Correlation = 0.5, sCER Quota:30%
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Figure 3.5: Scenario 3, Correlation = 0.1, sCER Quota:15%
it is possible that policy makers would add a REDD allowance quota on top of
the CDM quota. This reasoning implies that REDD allowances will exhibit the
same behavior as CDM allowances, which is taken as an assumption here since no
data on the value of REDD permits is available. In our third scenario we assume
that new carbon markets emerge world-wide in which the CDM can also be used
for abatement, reducing the correlation between the Wiener processes to 0.1. The
quota of allowed offset permits remains at 15%. In all simulations presented below
the volatility was set at 20%. We compare the case where no sCER can be purchased
to the different scenarios above. Therefore, the case when power plant operators can
only buy EUA permits is our baseline case, represented in all figures by the red line.
All figures show the probability that an investor will choose to build a gas power
plant at a certain point in time.
In figure 3.3 we can observe that gas power remains the dominant investment
choice until around year 10 if sCER permits cannot be used. The blue area describes
the investment difference caused by sCER over the whole time horizon. With sCER
this period is prolonged for a few more years. After this period, wind power quickly
becomes the more likely investment choice, as we can see from the downward sloping
probability curve. The availability of sCER does not only prolong the period in
which investing into wind power is highly unlikely. They also cause a difference in
later years. Figure 3.4 shows the results for scenario 2. We can observe that doubling
the sCER quota leads to a significant change as compared to scenario 1 since the blue
area increases significantly. The time when sCER starts having an influence is equal.
Figure 3.5 shows the results of testing if a change in the correlation between the
Wiener-Processes has a significant impact. When comparing the results to scenario
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one, where all inputs are the same besides the correlation rate, we see that there is
no significant change as compared to scenario 1.
3.5.2 Discussion and sensitivity checks
What we can observe from the figures 3.3-3.5 in general is that the incentive to
invest into wind energy even without the possibility to acquire sCER permits in
either scenario remains low until until around year 10 increasing rapidly afterwards..
When sCER permits can be used, gas power investments become more lucrative.
Even though the investment probability into gas decreases equally fast as in the EUA
only scenario, the investment probability over the whole time horizon increases. As
a sensitivity check for our results we consider a range of interest rates, volatilities,
wind energy premiums, and trend values. We use the values from scenario 1 as a
standard and report the changes in values we made below the figures. Scenario 1
is always in the middle of the set of figures that follow now, in order to make the
comparison easier. The left and right side represent a decrease/increase in value we
check for sensitivity respectively.
Testing for changing interest rates, we find that lower risk-adjusted interest rates
lead to a higher investment probability for wind power. As an example we show how
changing the risk adjusted rate to 3-5% impacts investment in Figures 3.6-3.8. We
do not report the results for changing the risk-free interest rate, as these changes
led to no significant change of the results.
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Figure 3.6: Risk free rate
2%; Risk adjusted rate 3%
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Figure 3.8: Risk free rate
2%; Risk adjusted rate 5%
When using the same specification as in scenario 1 and changing the interest
rates to 3% (risk adjusted) and 2% (risk free), we find that gas power is not an
investment choice anymore. This significant change stems from the fact that wind
power becomes more profitable relative to gas power since emission prices increase
over time. The less this future profit is discounted, the more profitable wind power
becomes today. Thus, in an infinite time horizon model wind power would always
be the more profitable than gas power despite the large investment cost difference11.
11In our model the investment cost into a wind power plant is 4,334,769,230 US $ as compared
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Consequently, when increasing the interest rate to 5%, the investment likelihood of
gas increases. This also shows that the two power plants are already very similar in
terms of cost, when considering a longer time period and increasing permit prices.
Secondly, we test for three different volatility values. Figures 3.9-3.11 show the
effect of changing volatility from 10% to 20%, and then to 30%. Increasing the
volatility leads to a higher probability that at a certain point in time an investor
decides to invest into a gas power plant. This effect is more pronounced as we move
along the time axis. A high level of volatility generally increases the value of options,
since the value of the new information that arrives increases and it pays to wait for
this information to materialize. In the context of our model a high volatility implies
a higher chance in later periods that the emission price can be very low, rendering
gas power investment more likely.
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Figure 3.9: Volatility 10%
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Figure 3.10: Volatility 20%
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Figure 3.11: Volatility 30%
Thirdly, we consider different levels of the wind premium. Figures 3.12-3.14 show
the impact the subsidy has in investment behavior for the levels 10 e, 20 e, and 30
e.
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Figure 3.12: Premium 10e
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Figure 3.14: Premium 30e
When the premium is only 10 e, investing into wind power becomes very unlikely
even towards the end of the time horizon. In contrast, at a level of 30 ewind power
is so profitable that the investor start to build wind power plants from the very
to 603,105,882 US $ for a gas power plant.
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beginning. This is not surprising as a 30 e subsidy implies a 50% mark-up over the
market price. More interesting is that the 10 e premium is not sufficient to induce
significant wind power investment over the whole time horizon. If policy makers have
the goal to promote renewable investments in the medium term, a 20 e premium
seems to be the necessary. However, such a result should be treated with care as we
do not consider a range of other effects that impact investment behavior, such as
the interrelation between emission, gas and electricity prices. What can be stated
is that a premium is still necessary for wind energy up until the medium term, if it
is a policy goal to promote investment into wind energy.
Finally, we test different trend values for the sCER price process (Figures 3.15-
3.17). Increasing the trend value for sCER lowers the positive effect of sCER on gas
investments. This is intuitively appealing, since a higher trend value will lead to a
lower gap in between sCER and EUA permits in later years rendering gas investment
less profitable. However, even if both price processes have a trend value of 5%, the
possibility of using sCER still has a positive effect on the investment probability in
gas power.
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Figure 3.15: sCER
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Figure 3.16: sCER
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Figure 3.17: sCER
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The results presented here should be treated with care, since we assume two
stochastic price processes which represent a best guess of the future based on previ-
ous modeling approaches in the literature and the current political situation. Also,
since we simplified the model as much as possible in order to focus on the effect
of the sCER permit class Many interacting features of energy markets, such as the
dependence of the gas and electricity price on emission permit prices, have been
left out. Including them would have resulted in an identification problem of the
sCER effect. Leaving them out means that changes to the functioning of the permit
market might not have the same effect as in our model, since other effects such
as the interdependence of natural resource markets can overcompensate any effect
stemming from permit markets. Therefore, the general direction of the effect should
be taken as the main result of our simulations, not specific results for each year.
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By conducting a range of sensitivity checks we could show which factors are
crucial to the investment decision, namely the interest rate, the wind premium and
volatility. The interest rate is the most crucial factor, as small changes can already
trigger large differences in investment decision. This is not surprising considering
the length of the investment decision we are considering here and the profit profile
of gas power plants. Gas power plants are very profitable at the beginning with
low permit prices. As prices rise, they become increasingly less profitable and the
more this effect is discounted, the higher the incentive of the investor to choose wind
power plants.
3.5.3 Policy implications
The results presented in the model are not meant as a tool for investment decision
making for firms, rather they should inform policy makers about the probable con-
sequences of a certain policy framework. Therefore, we do not provide a fixed date
when investment into either power plant type takes places, rather we provide the
probabilities to indicate the most likely event and to see the development over time.
This goal and also limitation of the model sets a clear boundary with respect to
the usefulness for investment decision making. The results indicate that allowing
abatement via sCER permits has a negative impact on wind power investment for
a set of assumptions standard in the current energy literature. This also implies
that the value of the option to invest into a gas power plant increases by allowing
sCER usage. The results showed that at the current low market prices for emission
permits, allowing more baseline-credit-scheme credits with similar characteristics as
the sCER, does change investment behavior significantly (Scenario 2) compared to
the current 15% quota regime (Scenario 1).
Thus, if policymakers do allow abatement via baseline-credit-schemes, it is im-
portant that they ensure that the abatement does actually take place in the origi-
nating countries. Since these credits reduce the incentive to invest into renewable
energy in developed countries and may therefore cause more pollution on a global
scale, it must be ensured that the abatement in the originating country does take
place. The CDM has been criticized for not ensuring this happens and our results
confirm that this is an important issue to be addressed, considering the impact the
CDM has on investment behavior in developed countries. The EU has built in a
safeguard for this issue, requiring operators to retire one EUA permit if a sCER
permit is used 12. However, this implies that the abatement actually still does take
12”Subject to paragraph 3, during each period referred to in Article 11(2), Member States may
allow operators to use CERs and ERUs from project activities in the Community scheme up to
a percentage of the allocation of allowances to each installation, to be specified by each Member
State in its national allocation plan for that period. This shall take place through the issue and
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place in the EU in addition to the abatement in the originating country. Therefore,
the CDM is more a tool to promote green energy investment in developing countries,
rather than a mechanism to allow abatement to take place where it is cheapest.
Finally, policy makers should consider that allowing sCER requires them to
subsidize renewable energy at a higher rate than without them. sCER make fossil
fuels a more attractive energy option. If it is a political goal to increase the share of
renewable energy, this renewable energy will consequently require higher subsidies.
Since the costs of the subsidies are usually born by consumers and companies, this
represents a social welfare factor worthwhile to consider.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper a modeling framework was presented in order to answer two questions:
 What is the probability that in t years the value of the option to build a
gas plant is larger than investing into a wind power plant under permit price
uncertainty?
 What is the impact of being able to use permits originating from the Clean
Development Mechanism on this probability?
These questions will become more important as carbon markets mature and more
financial and risk-management tools become available over the next years. The ma-
turing of the market will stem from two main influences: First of all, more obligatory
cap-and-trade ETS will emerge world-wide moving actors further along the learn-
ing curve of what tools they need and how such markets operate. Secondly, more
baseline-credit-schemes such as REDD are likely to emerge. Connecting those offset
mechanisms with a variety of separate carbon markets worldwide, and evaluating
the impact on renewable energy investment will be a major task for policy makers.
In our model we included the two main permit classes in the currently only
obligatory cap-and-trade ETS world wide, the EU ETS. In the EU ETS energy
producers can trade and buy emission permits that are allocated or auctioned by
the EU and national governments (EUA), or use the flexible Kyoto mechanisms,
a baseline-credit-schemes, to achieve the required emission reductions. We focused
on the currently most influential permit class originating from the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanisms (CDM), secondary Certified Emission Reductions (sCER). These
are resold primary CER which are obtained by investing in projects in developing
immediate surrender of one allowance by the Member State in exchange for one CER or ERU
held by the operator in the national registry of its Member State” - http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2004:338:0018:0018:EN:PDF
47
countries that save emissions due to the investors involvement. Together, the EUA
and sCER make up more than 95% of the EU ETS market. The permit prices
follow stochastic processes which are taken as exogenous by a price taking firm.
Both price processes evolve according to a geometric Brownian motion with a pos-
itive trend. The increments of the Wiener process of the two price-processes are
positively correlated.
In order to answer the first question, we calculated the option value to invest into
a gas power plant relative to the profits made by investing into a wind power plant.
We simulated three different policy scenarios, comparing the gas power plant option
value with the wind power plant, in order to answer our second question: First of
all, a business-as-usual scenario in which regulation and the interdependence of the
two permit classes are similar to current conditions. Secondly, a scenario in which
more offset permits can be used in order fulfill abatement requirements. Finally,
we considered a scenario in which new ETS markets emerge worldwide changing
the correlation between the two Wiener processes. In nearly all scenarios we find
a negative influence of sCER on the investment probability in wind power plants.
The probability of investing in a wind power plant is modestly reduced in scenarios
1 and 3, while in scenario 2 the reduction is large. Our sensitivity analysis shows
that the two energy types are relatively close in terms of cost competitiveness when
taking into account the price development of permit prices over a longer period of
time. Lower interest rates lead to a higher likelihood of investment into wind power.
This is due to the effect that over time wind becomes relatively more profitable to
gas as permit prices rise and a lower discount rate strengthens this effect. Increasing
the volatility leads to a higher investment probability for gas power plants in later
periods. This is due to the effect that the information value of waiting increases
with higher volatility, rendering the option to wait to invest into a gas power plant
more valuable. Finally, even when using the same trend value for both permits
classes, the availability of sCER permits renders investment into gas power more
likely. Since our model represents a best guess of the future development of permit
prices based on previous results in the literature and the current political situation,
it is the general direction and relative inter-scenario size of the effect which is the
main result. We included a premium for wind power electricity to simulate a feed-
in tariff like subsidy. The results showed that a substantial subsidy will still be
necessary under current conditions for the coming years. Disallowing the usage of
sCER permits could reduce the level of the subsidy.
In conclusion, allowing abatement via sCER permits has a negative effect on
investment probability for uncertainty free wind power plants and a positive on the
option value of gas power plants, given current modeling values for energy invest-
ments. Considering that other forms of renewable energy are even more expensive in
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their cost structures, this result implies a general negative effect of sCER on all re-
newable energy investments. This effect can contribute to locking the energy sector
in a fossil fuel state since investment once undertaken is irreversible and long-lived,
and might therefore requiring countervailing measures. This does not automatically
imply that CO2 emission levels are higher with the availability of sCER. Since the
energy sector faces a maximum level of emissions in the EU, their availability may
only change the composition of energy production, not the amount emissions as long
as the limit is fully used. We also showed that changes in the economic environment,
which can lead to changes in the standard parameter values used for energy invest-
ments, can have a significant impact on the likelihood of investing in renewables,
due to their interplay effect on the long-term profitability of an energy type.
Several extensions of the model presented here are interesting for future research.
First of all, since we only consider a price taking firm it would be interesting to look
at a market in which the company can influence either the price of permits or the
allocation by the government, thus endogenizing the price development of emission
permits. Furthermore, one could consider a firm that can purchase sCER but can
also directly invest into CDM projects, thereby obtaining pCER. Also, if data are
available on new offset mechanisms, it will be interesting to see how they influence
each other and the investment behavior. Finally, it would be interesting to look at
the impact of offset mechanisms if a company already has a a portfolio of power
plants.
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Chapter 4
The Influence of Permit Price
Uncertainty and Lobbying on
Energy Investments
4.1 Introduction
The importance of environmental issues in the policy arena has changed substan-
tially over the last decades. Issues such as acid rain, the depletion of the ozone
layer and climate change have put environmental concerns high on the priority list
of policy makers. Solutions to these issues range from market based approaches,
voluntary agreements, to command-and-control approaches. Not surprisingly, these
regulatory decision have affected especially industrial sectors (energy, oil, carmak-
ers) and led to the formation of lobby groups who try to influence the political
process in their favor. With the introduction of renewable energy support mecha-
nisms especially in many European countries, renewable energy producers have also
become an important lobbying force over the last decade, for example the European
Wind Energy Association with over 700 members from 60 countries1 . Furthermore,
non-governmental organizations (NGO) have increasingly become involved in the
political process, usually with opposing views to those of the industrial lobby.
Early political economy investigation of the impact of lobbying on political deci-
sion making focused on the losses caused by competing lobby groups (Becker, 1983,
1985). In their seminal work Grossman and Helpman (1994) present a model in
which several groups make political contributions in order to influence trade policy.
More recently, Conconi (2003) considered the impact of green lobbies on interna-
tional trade. Furthermore, a literature related to lobbying and its effect on emission
markets has evolved. Lai (2006) focuses on the impact of lobbying on the initial
allocation of pollution rights. Lai (2008) investigates if auctioning, grandfathering
or a hybrid instrument is chosen when environmental and industrial groups can
influence the process. Hanley and Mackenzie (2010) consider a three stage model
where firms have the opportunity to increase their own permit allocation and the
aggregate permit allocation. Habla and Winkler (2013) introduce a model where
governments first decide whether to become part of an international permit market
and in the second stage about national permit allocations. In both stages lobby
groups can influence the outcome.
A central element missing in the before mentioned literature is uncertainty.
When considering the impact of uncertainty on investors in the electricity sector,
where investments are usually irreversible, employing real options methodology is
a viable approach. Compared to methodologically simpler approaches such as Net
Present Value (NPV), a real options approach takes into account future realizations,
allowing optimal timing of the investment decision. After the original development
of financial options valuation by Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), their
techniques were adopted for real-investments in the physical sense by Myers (1977).
1http://www.ewea.org/about-us/
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Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and Trigeoris (1996) provide a good overview with numer-
ous examples. Real options applications to the environmental and energy questions
have been on the rise in recent years2, but none have considered the impact of
lobbying.
Attempting to bring the fields of real-option analysis and political economy
closer, we address the following questions:
 What is the impact of lobbying for wind or gas power on the investment
decision under permit price uncertainty?
 When is the option to lobby used?
 Is the wind or gas lobbying option used?
These questions are of relevance as large energy companies seem reluctant to invest
large sums into renewable energy, despite a range of newly provided incentives, such
as feed-in tariffs. Furthermore, large energy companies do not seem to engage in
lobbying activity to enhance the profitability of renewables. We want to show if this
behavior can be explained in an uncertainty framework where lobbying for fossil
energy implies the reduction of permit price cost, and lobbying for wind implies a
premium on the electricity price compared to fossil energy. Also, we want to get a
sense of the magnitude of the incentives that are necessary to impact the investment
behavior of large energy companies. The results we generate with our model are best
interpreted as information for a government that wants to evaluate the effectiveness
of its renewable policy while allowing lobbying for fossil energy, not as an indication
of actual investment decisions of companies. A much more complex model including
daily data and a range of other stochastic processes would be required to simulate
this.
In order to answer these questions, we incorporate uncertainty in a simplified set-
ting where an investor can choose between investing in a wind or a gas power plant
over a fixed time horizon. Uncertainty stems from the stochastically evolving permit
price which also affects the electricity price. The permit price follows a geometric
Brownian Motion (gBM) with a positive trend. In the first year 40 gas power plants
are installed, and each year one plant needs to be replaced. Simultaneously, the
investor can choose to lobby the government in order to decrease the permit price
for one period by a fixed percentage, or to receive a higher remuneration for wind en-
ergy. Lobbying expenses are irreversible once incurred and cannot be used for other
purposes. The opportunity to spend money on lobbying efforts therefore represents
2See for example Insley (2003); Abadie and Chamorro (2006, 2008); Yang et al. (2008); Fuss
et al. (2009, 2010); Abadie and Galarraga (2011). For a more elaborate overview we point the
reader to Hieronymi and Schu¨ller (2013).
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a real-option to render gas or wind power plants more profitable in a certain period.
By employing this approach the investor takes into consideration the complete time
horizon when making his decision, which might lead to a postponement of lobbying
efforts to later periods when the price is likely to be higher.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides some background
information about the politics of lobbying on climate change issues. In Section 3
the model is described. Section 4 describes the data used in the model. In Section
5 we present and discuss the results of our model and perform a range of sensitivity
checks. In section 6 we conclude.
4.2 Lobbying and the politics of climate change
The main interest groups involved in climate change policies in the European Union
(EU) and the United States (US) are the democratic state, polluting industry and
NGOs (Svendsen, 1999; Gullberg, 2008). Fredriksson et al. (2005) show that in
more democratic states environmental policy is more stringent, but that a threshold
needs to be reached before this effect plays a role. Furthermore, he shows that
when this threshold has been passed, the number of NGOs active on environmental
issues raises stringency as well. While NGOs have been able to exert more influence
on the climate policy process (Gulbrandsen and Andresen, 2004), energy intensive
companies and the polluting industries have considerably more resources to influence
the process and are better organized (Gullberg, 2008; Wettestad, 2009). Large
energy producers with high CO2 levels are organized via EUR-ELECTRIC in the
EU. A comprehensive overview of lobbying organizations for different industries
can be found in Markussen and Svendsen (2005). In some cases environmentalists
and industrialists cooperate, for example when pushing for wind energy subsidies
(Brandt and Svendsen, 2004). However, usually they represent starkly contrasting
views. A case study by Skodvin et al. (2010) shows how the option of introducing a
large scale auctioning system, favored by NGOs over the grandfathering approach,
was discarded due to lobbying by polluting industries. In some cases, even industrial
lobby groups have differing goals. Helm (2010) looks at the British renewable and
emissions policy, and also finds evidence of lobbying activity that influenced the
policy making process in a way to be more industrial friendly.
Whereas some energy lobby groups favor a low CO2 permit price, mostly carbon
intensive producers that rely on coal energy, others favor a high permit price such
as producers that own many gas and nuclear power plants. The reason for this
apparently odd behavior by gas and nuclear power producers lies in the way rents
accrue in the energy market with the introduction of CO2 permits (Keppler and
Cruciani, 2010). The electricity price at any point in time is set by the highest cost
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base load power plant, which is usually a emission intensive fossil fuel based plant.
So called infra-marginal rents accrue when a high cost power plant is producing
at the same time as a lower cost energy plant that can sell its electricity for the
same price. In the past these infra-marginal rents compensated producers for the
various types of production and dispatch risks. The distribution and significance
of these infra-marginal rents has changed with the introduction of CO2 permits.
In most cases the permit price was fully passed on to the consumer, even though
permits were allocated via grand-fathering. Carbon intensive producers were able
to reap some extra profit, while relatively carbon free energy production from gas
and nuclear power became significantly more profitable the higher the permit price
(Keppler and Cruciani, 2010). These effects are also likely to occur when permits
are fully auctioned, favoring low emission energy plants even further.
In the following model description we abstract from this situation and focus on
the case when higher permit prices would actually represent a cost increase instead
of an net increase in profit due to infra-marginal rents. Furthermore, we do not
consider fossil fuel production competition due to already operating nuclear and
coal plants, which lies at the core of the above described behavior. Instead, we
investigate the incentive to invest into renewable energy as compared to fossil fuel
power while lobbying can influence the profitability of either renewable or fossil fuels.
4.3 The Model
4.3.1 Profit function and investment option
In our model we look at an energy investor that represents the energy industry as
a whole. We consider this as the appropriate modeling approach, since lobbying
in disaggregated form on energy issues on a company by company level is usually
not observed, as described in section 2. Furthermore, one company alone is not
able to influence the permit price, therefore each single company is a price taker.
However, when organized internationally with all the major companies part of such
a lobbying organization, the permit price can be influenced. We abstract from
cartel issues and do not consider tacit collusion and price manipulation. Instead,
we consider the possibility of influencing the political process in order to reduce the
emission permit price in order to render fossil energy investments more profitable,
or to engage in lobby activity that leads to a higher electricity price for wind energy.
Our model simulates a 40 year period. In every year a predetermined amount
of existing infrastructure needs to be replaced. The investor can either choose to
replace the existing infrastructure with a wind power or a gas power plant. Both
types of investments are considered as irreversible. Companies have to comply with
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Gas/Wind Power Plant
No LobbyingWind PremiumPermit Price Reduction
Figure 4.1: Investment/ Lobbying decision at time t
emission abatement requirements when investing into gas power plants, which is
done by obtaining emission permits. Permits are not grandfathered but have to
be purchased. An increase of the permit price triggers an electricity price increase.
How much of the cost can be passed through is fixed at the beginning of the model.
The investor decides each period if he wants to invest into lobbying efforts which
are costly and irreversible. By employing a real-options methodology the investor
can postpone this investment taking future realizations into account. This increases
the value of the lobbying options compared to an NPV approach. If lobbying is
carried out the permit price is reduced by a fixed proportion ∈ [0, 1] or the electricity
price received for energy from wind power plants is increased by a fixed amount.
As a simplifying assumption permit price reductions or energy price increases due
to lobbying are intertemporally unrelated. This means increases/reductions have to
be renegotiated each period and there is no permanent effect. Both are set back
to their respective prices without the influence of lobbying efforts at the end of a
period. In Figure 4.1 the decision tree an investor faces each period is illustrated.
The motivation for the reduction of permit prices stems from the negotiations
concerning the long-term CO2 reduction target in the EU. The reduction target
until 2020 has now been fixed at 20% compared to 1990 emissions levels, scraping
an envisioned 30% reduction during recent negotiations. The long-term reduction
goal until 2050 is still under discussion. As the overall cap for the ETS is decided
by the reduction goal, lobbying on this issue is most closely related to our lobbying
approach. If the reduction target can successfully be pushed down via lobbying,
the permit price will decrease since the cap will be at a higher level. Concerning
the wind energy premium, feed-in tariffs for renewable energy production are most
closely related to our modeling approach. Feed-in tariffs pay producers of renewable
energy a premium over the market price, usually fixed for a time period exceeding
10 years. These have become an important tool for the rapid development of a
renewable energy capacity. The profit function is defined as follows:
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Profit Function:
pi(xt, at, bt, P
P
t ) = q
eP ewt(bt)−qg(xt)P g−OC(xt)−c(at)−l(bt)−(1−L(bt))qP (xt)P Pt
(4.3.1)
 xt = State the system is currently in at time t ; Gas plants and/or wind power
plants operating.
 at = Energy investment chosen at point t ; Gas plant or wind power plant.
 bt Lobbying choice at point t ; Gas or Wind lobbying or no lobbying.
 wt(bt) ∈ [0, 30] Wind premium in period t.
 qe, Pe = Quantity and price of electricity
 qg, Pg = Quantity and price of gas
 OC = Operating and maintenance cost
 c(at) = One-Time Investment cost depending on the action chosen
 l(bt) = One-Time lobbying cost
 L(bt) ∈ [0, 1] = Permit price reduction when lobbying for gas power is carried
out
 qP , P P = Price and quantity of permits purchased
The time horizon of the model is 40 years. This time horizon has been chosen,
since the average operating life-time of a gas power plant is about 30 years. The
average operating life for an onshore wind power plant 25 years (IEA, 2010).
4.3.2 Permit Price-process
The price for emission permits follows a stochastic process. In accordance with
results from the current literature that model the price development for European
Emission Trading System permits (EU-ETS) (Yang et al., 2008; Fuss et al., 2008,
2009, 2010), we assume a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with a 5% positive
trend. This is essentially a political assumption. If the global goal is to limit the
temperature increase caused by climate change to 2°C and permit markets are to
play an important role in this, permit prices need to increase with a 5% trend.
Otherwise the incentives to invest into carbon free forms of energy are insufficient.
A second way of interpreting this modeling approach is that the 2°C goal with the
56
necessary permit price increase represents the constant lobbying pressure by NGOs
who work for a sustainable future.
The price process can then be described as follows: Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability
space and let Wt be a Wiener process with respect to a probability measure P. Let
(Ft)t be the filtration generated by Wt. The price process Pt is described by the
following equation:
dPt
Pt
= µdt+ σdWt. (4.3.2)
Hence Pt is a stochastic processes following a GBM. Here P1,t models the price
process for EUA permits. µ is the drift parameter, σ the volatility parameter.
4.3.3 Bellman equation
The investor knows that emission permit prices evolve stochastically from a known
starting value and therefore his problem is to determine the type of power plant he
wants to invest in, and if he wants to invest into lobbying. In order to analyze this,
we use the following Bellman equation solved recursively:
Vt(xt, at, bt, P
P
t ) = max
at∈At(xt),bt∈Bt(xt)
{pi(xt, at, bt, P Pt ) + e−rE[Vt+1(xt+1, P Pt+1, )|P Pt ]}
(4.3.3)
The first part of the equation is the immediate revenue stream a company obtains
when investing into any of the two power plants or both at the same time. At(xt)
is the set of feasible actions for a given state xt and r. For example, if a gas plant
has already been built At(xt) compromises the following actions: Build a gas power
plant or a wind power plant. Bt(xt) stands for the possible lobbying actions: Wind
premium, Permit price reduction, or no lobbying.
4.4 Data
4.4.1 Power Plant Data
In table 4.1 costs and CO2 emissions of the different power plants are listed
3. These
are derived from ”Projected Costs of Generating Electricity - 2010” (IEA, 2010) and
current market data from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) (EEX, 2014). We
compare a Combined Cylce Gas Turbine (CCGT) with an Onshore wind power
plant. We follow Fuss et al. (2010) in assuming that operation & maintenance cost
(O&M) as well as capital cost are deterministic. The load factor is the average
3All e values are converted into $ values at an exchange rate of 1.35 $/e.
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Table 4.1: Electricity Generating Cost
CCGT Onshore Wind
Generation Capacity (MW) 480 45
Capital cost (overnight cost) (US$/kW) 1,068.00 2,348.00
Fuel Cost (US$ /MWh) 36,45 0
O&M (US$ /MWh) 4.48 21.92
CO2 emissions (tCO2/MWh) 0,33 0
Load Factor 85% 26%
Electricity price (US$) 81 81
Lifetime 30 years 25 years
Risk-adjusted rate 5% 5%
Source: IEA (2010); EEX (2014)
Table 4.1: Electricity Generating Cost
yearly usage of the full capacity of the power plant. Capital cost can be considered
as overnight cost, which are the cost that would apply if the plant could be con-
structed overnight 4. Using overnight costs for two different types of plants is a valid
assumption, if the lead time does not differ substantially which is the case for wind
and gas power (IEA, 2010; Kettunen et al., 2011). The electricity price is set at 60
e which lies approximately in between the medium-term baseload and peak market
price (EEX, 2014) 5. Concerning the deterministic gas price, long-term contracts are
common for gas deliveries and current research estimates a stable mean-reverting
trend for gas prices (Abadie and Chamorro, 2006; Boogert and de Jong, 2011). We
do not consider technological progress since both power plants types are mature
technologies which we assume to experience similar speed of technological improve-
ment in the long-term, which leaves the overall investment decision unaffected. In
the model, we consider the replacement of a 400 MW plant each year, which is
roughly equal to the production capacity of one average gas power plant or 34 wind
turbines. This implies that investment behavior is driven by the relative cost differ-
ences of these power plant types, not by the absolute investment size difference of
an average gas power plant compared to a wind power plant
We assume a risk-adjusted rate of 5%. These values are in accordance with the
literature on power investment (Kaplan, 2008; IEA, 2010; Kettunen et al., 2011).
We use the same risk-adjusted rates for both power plant types, since the risk-
4”The overnight cost therefore excludes escalation in equipment, labor, and commodity prices
that could occur during the time a plant is under construction. It also excludes the financing
charges, often referred to as interest during construction (IDC), incurred while the plant is being
built”. (Kaplan, 2008, p.696)
5All data stemming from the EEX website, the electricity, gas and permit prices, were taken
on 22. January 2014.
58
Table 4.2: Electricity and Price Process Data
EU-ETS
Permit price trend 5%
Permit price volatility 20%
Permit starting price 8,8 US$
Electricity price pass through 30%
Wind power premium 27 US$
Table 4.2: Electricity and Price Process Data
adjusted rate only matters for operation and construction risk which is similar for
both investment types.
4.4.2 Permit prices, electricty price and volatility
In table 4.2 the assumptions concerning the permit price process are listed6. We
take current future prices of EU-ETS as a point of departure 7. In accordance with
current literature and modelling, we assume that the trend of the EU-ETS price
is 5% and the volatility 20% (Fuss et al., 2010; Kettunen et al., 2011). We stress
again that the 5% increase is a political assumption. If permit markets are to play
a dominant role in offering the necessary incentives to limit to impact of climate
change to 2°C by the end of the century, such a price increase will be necessary over
time (Fuss et al., 2010). An alternative interpretation of this assumption is that
this is the result of environmental pressure groups influencing the political process,
thereby representing the counter weight to the industrial lobbying efforts. The high
volatility found in the literature is due to the strong influence of political decision
making on this market, which changes frequently. Currently, a set-aside is being
debated in order to revive the dwindling CO2 price, which would lead to a surge
in permit prices8. Concerning the pass through rate for the EU-ETS, Fezzi and
Bunn (2009) estimate that the pass through rate is around 30%, which we use as a
baseline value. Renewable energy currently receives a range of support besides the
indirect support of putting a price on CO2 emission. We choose to incorporate these
various form of support via a price premium for wind energy on the electricity price.
Concerning the size of the subsidy, we took the German market as an example. In
the German case, on-shore wind receives initially a very high premium, which can
last up to 13 years (Wikipedia, 2014). The premium is then slowly reduced to match
6All e values are converted into $ values at an exchange rate of 1.35 $/e.
7EUA:6,52 e; Data from http://www.eex.com Date: 02.01.2013 converted into US$
8http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/eu-parliament-calls-for-emissions-permit-set-
aside-option-1-.html
59
market prices. Based on the current feed-in tariff structure, on-shore wind energy
then receives a premium of approximately 20e per MWh. In the context of our
lobbying model, this premium should be interpreted as amount that lobbying is able
to convince policymakers of. Put differently, it stands symbolic for the receptiveness
of the political system towards lobbying efforts.
4.4.3 Lobbying Cost
In the US expenditures related to lobbying efforts have to be made public and can
be viewed on line9. For example, the lobbying expenditure of electric utilities was
about US $ 145. million in 2011. Not included in this number are donations for
political parties. We take this number as a indicative lower boundary for lobbying
expenditures for both wind and gas lobbying and perform sensitivity checks with
respect to different cost levels. Lobbying cost enter the model as a percentage of
investment cost of a gas power plant, as described above. The investment cost of a
gas power plant are based on the data provided above, totaling 427 Mill. $ 10.
Up until 2012 about 480 gas power plants were operating in Europe, with an
average capacity of about 360 MW11. In 2010, 1600 gas plants12 with a generating
capacity of 1000 GW(Gigawatt)13 were installed in the US, which is roughly 4 times
as many plants with 3 times the generating capacity compared to Europe. We
assume that the larger the market, the larger the lobbying expenses. Based on this
we estimate that the lobbying expenditures in Europe should be around a fourth, of
the US lobbying expenditures. This implies an indicative lower bound of around 36
Mill.$. Setting this in relation to the investment cost for a gas power plant, the lower
bound for lobbying expenses is around 8.5% of the investment cost in our model.
Since we only consider a model with 40 plants operating, this can be considered a
conservative estimate since there are nine times as many plants operating in Europe,
which implies that much more capacity needs to be replaced than in our model.
Therefore, the actual lobbying expenditure per power plant is probably smaller.
9http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/
10400 MW * 1000 (KW conversion)* 1068 $ (overnight cost)*0.85 (capacity factor) = 427 Mill.
US
11http://www.ecoprog.com/en/publications/energy-industry/gas-power-plants.htm
12http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/table5.1.pdf
13http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/pdf/tablees1.pdf
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 Results
In this section we report the results of our model. Each scenario is run 2,000 times.
The first graph for each scenario shows the number of gas plants that are installed
in a certain year. The model starts with 40 gas plants and 1 plant has to be replaced
every year. Thus, if less than 40 plants are gas plants the remaining ones are wind
power based. The red line shows the number of gas plants installed when companies
can lobby, while the blue line shows the case when no lobbying is possible.
First of all, we consider the effect of allowing lobbying for wind as compared to
the case where only gas lobbying can take place. Unless reported differently, certain
values remain the same for all scenarios in this section and won’t be reported again:
The volatility rate of the permit price was set at 20%, the emissions price trend at
5%, the pass through rate at 30% and the interest rate at 5%. In figure 4.2 the
results for the case where only gas lobbying is allowed are reported. When only gas
lobbying is allowed, gas plants are are replaced by gas plants and only towards the
end of the time horizon wind investment becomes a possible choice, as can be seen
in figure 4.3 where. In figure 4.4 we report the lobbying activity. No gas lobbying
activity is carried out over the whole time horizon. The potential reduction in the
permit price does not seem sufficient in order to justify the expenses which have to
be incurred for lobbying.
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In figures 4.5-4.8 we report the results for the case when both types of lobbying
are allowed, and the wind premium is equal to 20 e. As can be seen in figure
4.5, wind power becomes the replacement choice after a few years and by year 40
more than a quarter of the energy production is carried out by wind energy. In
figure 4.6 we report the investment probability for wind. It quickly rises and reaches
more than 50% by the end of the time horizon. The probability of wind investment
with the opportunity to lobby is significantly higher than the without lobbying,
as indicated by the blue area in figure 4.5. Wind lobbying becomes a profitable
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choice and lobbying activity rises quickly, reaching 70% towards the end of the time
horizon. Gas lobbying is not carried out at all in this scenario. In figure 4.8 the
CO2 price is depicted. The price is the same with or without lobbying, since no
gas lobbying is carried out which would impact the permit price. The increase over
time stems from the price process by which the permit prices are driven, which we
described in section 4.2.
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Figure 4.8: CO2 Price
Wind premium scenario
In figures 4.9-4.11 we report the results of a scenario which shows the necessary
level of incentives in order to stimulate gas lobbying. Lobbying cost are 10% of
gas power investment cost, the permit price reduction of successful gas lobbying is
75%, and the wind power premium is 10e. In this scenario, gas power investment
remains the dominant choice since only at the end of the time horizon wind power
investment does take place. More importantly, lobbying for gas power dominates
wind power lobbying over the whole time period (Figure 4.10), which leads to a
significant drop in the CO2 price over time (Figure 4.11).
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Figure 4.11: CO2 price
Gas lobbying scenario
Finally, we present two scenarios to make a comparison between the European
Energy Markets with its feed-in tariffs and the US system with no CO2 markets
or substantial renewable subsidies. The main renewable energy support mechanism
in the US are production tax credits, which have not been considered as reliable
mainly due to a uncertain renewal policy (Lewis and Wiser, 2007; Barradale, 2010).
In both scenarios, gas power lobbying is able to reduce the permit price by 100%.
This implies that gas power lobbying is able to completely offset the cost of CO2
emissions, or put differently, it can completely stop the establishment of an effective
permit market. The first scenario with 100% gas power lobbying effectiveness and
no renewable subsidy is depicted in Figures 4.12-4.14. In the second scenario, we
also allow for a wind power premium of 20e in order to show the difference such a
mechanism would cause. The results of this scenario are shown in Figures 4.15-4.17.
Without a renewable subsidy and a 100% effectiveness of gas power lobbying,
nearly no renewable energy infrastructure is installed after a 40 year time period
(Figure 4.12). Furthermore, after the CO2 price reaches approximately 10e gas
lobbying activity quickly starts developing, reaching a probability of 0.4 by the end
of the time period (Figure 4.13). This heavily influences the CO2 price, which
remains at a level of around 10e until year 30 when it starts to increase again
(Figure 4.14).
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Figure 4.14: CO2 price
US scenario no subsidy
When introducing a renewable subsidy of 20e, even a 100% permit price reduc-
tion is not sufficient to render gas power more profitable than wind energy. At the
end of the time period about quarter of the energy production stems from renewable
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energy (Figure 4.15). This is very similar to the results obtained in the ”Wind Pre-
mium” scenario, where gas power lobbying only had a 20% effectiveness (Figure 4.5).
In comparison to this scenario some gas lobbying activity is carried out, even though
at a relatively low level compared to wind power lobbying (Figure 4.16). Therefore,
the CO2 price with lobbying differs minimally from the one without (Figure 4.17).
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Figure 4.17: CO2 price
US scenario with subsidy
4.5.2 Sensitivity checks
In this section we report a range of sensitivity checks with respect to the interest
rate, volatility, gas price, trend of the price process, wind energy premium, and the
potential permit price reduction due to the lobbying effort. As a baseline comparison
we choose the following values: Lobbying cost are 20% of gas plant investment cost,
the permit price reduction is 20%, and the wind power premium is 20e. In the
following sets of graphs we lower the value we test for sensitivity to the left, and
increase it to the right.
The impact from changing the interest rates from 1%-5%-9% on gas investment
can be seen in figures 4.18-4.20, the impact on the lobbying effort in figures 4.21-4.23.
A 1% interest rate leads to a complete replacement of the original 40 gas power plants
by the end of the time horizon with lobbying activity. This is due to the fact that
a low interest rate favors wind power, since this type of power generation becomes
more profitable relative the gas power the higher the permit price. Since the price
process follows a gBM with a positive trend, the effect increases the further we move
along in time. Consequently, at a 9% interest rate there are only few wind power
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plants installed by the end of the time horizon.
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Figure 4.20: Interest Rate
9%
Concerning lobbying behavior, a similar pattern compared to previous results
can be observed. When wind power is very profitable and installed early on in
the model, it pays to invest into lobbying efforts for wind energy (Interest Rate 1%,
Figure 4.21). When gas power is more profitable wind power lobbying still dominates
gas lobbying (Interest Rate 9%, Figure 4.23), but only leads to wind power as the
investment choice by the end of the time horizon.
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In figures 4.24-4.26 we show the results for differing wind premium values on the
number of gas power plants installed. The difference caused by decreasing/increasing
the wind premiums is substantial with respect to the amount of installed renewable
capacity by the end of the time horizon. Whereas a premium of 10e leads to
an installed capacity of less than 10%, a 20e premium already leads to a quarter
of installed renewable capacity, and a 30e premium leads to 100% of renewable
capacity in year 40.
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Figures 4.27-4.29 show the lobbying activity in these scenarios. Whereas a pre-
mium of 10e leads only to a wind lobbying probability of 30% by the end of the
time horizon, a premium of 30e increases this probability to one over nearly the
entire time horizon. Lobbying in order to increase the profitability of gas power
plants becomes entirely unprofitable in all scenarios.
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In figures 4.30-4.32 we report the impact of changing the permit price reduction
achieved by lobbying. We only report the lobbying probability, since the investment
probability only changes marginally with respect to the baseline scenario. The
figures show that when an investor can receive a 20e premium for wind energy
or a 0.1-03 permit price reduction, an investor rarely chooses to lobby for fossil
energy. Wind power lobbying behavior does not change substantially when varying
the permit reduction rate.
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Figure 4.30: Lobbying
Probability
(Permit price reduction
10%)
10 20 30 40
Time HyearsL
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Probability GasWind Lobbying
Wind
Gas
Figure 4.31: Lobbying
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Figure 4.32: Lobbying
Probability
(Permit price reduction
30%)
In Figures 4.33-4.38 we report the effect of changing the volatility on investment
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and lobbying behavior. The higher the volatility the more gas power plants are
installed even with a 20 e premium for wind energy. In the context of our model a
high volatility implies a higher chance in later periods that the emission price can be
very low, rendering gas power investment more likely. Lobbying behavior (Figures
4.36-4.38) does not change significantly compared to previous results.
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Figure 4.35: Gas power
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(Volatility 30%)
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Figure 4.36: Lobbying
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In figures 4.39-4.41 we report the impact of changing the gas price on investment
behavior. Figures 4.42-4.44 show the effect on lobbying behavior. Changing the
gas price to 10e renders gas power very profitable and leads to nearly no renewable
energy installed by the end of the time period, despite a 20e wind premium (Figure
4.39). A 50e gas price has the opposite effect, nearly all of the installed capacity is
wind energy based by the end of the time horizon (Figure 4.35). These results show
that he gas price has an impact on the results of our model, however changing the
values to 10e or 50e is arguably a tremendous price change which is usually not
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observed in the gas market, at least in the short to medium-term.
10 20 30 40
Time HyearsL
10
20
30
40
Number of gas plants
No LOB
LOB
Figure 4.39: Gas power In-
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Figure 4.41: Gas power In-
vestment
(Gas Price 50e)
Concerning lobbying behavior, a low gas price leads to a very low level of lobbying
activity for both wind and gas. A high gas price renders wind power lobbying very
lucrative, since a large quantity of wind power is quickly installed which renders the
already more lucrative wind lobbying relative to gas lobbying even more profitable.
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We also tested for a range of values for the price trend (1%, 5%, 10%), and
the lobbying cost (10%, 20%, 30%). None of the changes resulted in a significant
deviation from previous results concerning investment and lobbying behavior.
4.5.3 Discussion
The results we have presented so far indicate that wind lobbying is the preferred
choice, as CO2 prices seem to be too low to warrant lobbying for permit price
reductions. However, the size of the wind power premium needs to be substantial
in order to change the energy mix by the end of our time horizon. A premium of
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20e, a third of the starting electricity price in e, leads to 25% of installed wind
energy capacity, a 30e premium to 100%. Thus, at current permit prices, wind
lobbying needs to achieve a substantial effect in order to change from a fossil to a
renewable energy infrastructure. It is important note that our models start with 40
installed gas power plants. Therefore, wind lobbying has to be significantly more
profitable per power plant, in order to change the energy infrastructure, as lobbying
makes each power plant more profitable. We also reported the level of permit price
reduction and lobbying cost necessary in order to provide sufficient incentives for
energy producers to lobby for a permit price reduction. In a scenario with a 10e wind
energy premium, lobbying cost of 10% relative to gas power investment and a permit
price reduction of 75% lead to significant lobbying behavior towards permit price
reductions. If such a level is reasonable for the effect of lobbying is certainly open
to debate, but this gives an indication of the necessary effect that lobbying for fossil
fuels would need to have in order to be profitable. Furthermore, we presented two
scenarios in order to make a comparison between the US energy market with no CO2
market and renewable subsidies and the European market. In order to emulate the
US market within our model, we changed the permit reduction to 100% and removed
the renewable energy lobbying option. In such a model, nearly no renewable energy
will be installed by the end of the time horizon, gas lobbying becomes profitable
when the CO2 price reaches approximately 10e, and the CO2 price stays around
this level over the remaining time period due to lobbying activity. We then allowed
for renewable lobbying which yielded a 20e premium if successful, and found that
even though gas lobbying took place with a certain probability and reduced the
permit price towards the end of the time horizon, more than a fourth of the installed
energy generating capacity was renewable. This implies that a significant renewable
subsidy can overcome strong gas lobbying measures, at currently low CO2 prices.
Concerning the sensitivity tests, we found that the interest rate, the wind pre-
mium, the volatility and gas price have the largest effect on our results. The interest
rate is the most significant one as it affects the long-term investment prospects to
a large degree. This implies that policymakers must be well-informed concerning
the interest rate in an investment environment, if they want to judge the impact
of policy changes. Another factor that is mostly influenced by policymakers is the
volatility rate of permit prices. Permit markets are still strongly dependent on po-
litical decisions and therefore policymakers have a great level of influence on the
volatility rate. Considering the effect policy changes has on volatility is therefore an
important task.
Even though we only take a partial equilibrium perspective focusing on the prof-
itability of companies leaving social welfare consideration aside, it is worth to analyze
the rough magnitude of cost that the different scenarios imply. When only gas power
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lobbying is possible, the social planner suffers from a reduced revenue since the CO2
price can be depressed which leads to lower permit auction income. Allowing for
wind power lobbying renders gas lobbying unprofitable in most scenarios. There-
fore, these permit auction cost vanish. However, the cost to society for the wind
power subsidy and the higher cost for installing the considerably more expensive
energy type might be substantial. Assuming that there is no global carbon market,
renewable capacity installed in one region of the world does not imply overall lower
CO2 emissions due to carbon leakage issues. Avoided damages due to a reduced
externality level would then not factor in. One should also consider the potentially
lower fuel cost as less fossil energy is consumed, which increases the incentive for
fossil fuel investment again. In conclusion, providing a wind power premium may
entail substantial economic cost for society as a whole. Policy makers will have to
decide if the benefits of renewable energy production, less CO2 emissions at least
in individual countries, a lower long-term energy price as production cost decrease,
and jobs related to renewable energy production are worth the cost.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we presented a modeling framework to answer the following questions:
 What is the impact of lobbying for wind or gas power on the investment
decision under permit price uncertainty?
 When is the option to lobby used?
 Is the wind or gas lobbying option used?
We incorporate uncertainty in a setting where an investor chooses between re-
placing a pre-determined generating capacity with either wind or gas power. Fur-
thermore, he can choose to undertake lobbying efforts in order to influence the gov-
ernment to reduce the price of CO2 emission permits, or to receive a energy price
premium for wind power for one period. Whereas the investor has to build either
one of the power plant types, he can defer lobbying efforts. Therefore, the value
of lobbying is calculated as a put option in a real-options framework. The price of
emission permits develops according to a geometric Brownian Motion (gBM) with a
positive trend. Concerning lobbying efforts, the effectiveness of lobbying is fixed at
the beginning of each scenario, in terms of a percentage price reduction for permits,
or a fixed premium for wind energy. We interpret these values as the pliability of the
government towards lobbying efforts. Values for construction related cost, energy
production cost, and efficiency levels were taken from the literature.
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We find that lobbying for permit price reductions at the currently low CO2 price
level is only profitable if the potential reduction is very large (75-100%) and the
wind power premium is small (10e). Even a 5% emission price trend and 20%
volatility, leading to a permit price of 40e in year 40, are by itself not sufficient
to increase renewable investment. If the wind power premium is 20e, about a
quarter of the installed energy stems from wind by the end of our 40 year time
period, rising to 100% for a premium of 30e. Furthermore, wind lobbying activity
dominates any gas lobbying activity in such a scenario. The effect of wind lobbying
is also substantial, in that the difference between a wind lobbying and no lobbying
scenario in terms of investment probability into a wind power plant is up to 100%.
We also considered a scenario emulating the situation in the US market with no
CO2 market and no effective renewable support tool. In this scenario we allowed
for a 100% effectiveness of gas lobbying, implying that lobbying can completely stop
the operation of a CO2 market. We found that in such a scenario the amount of
renewable energy is negligible by the end of the time period. Furthermore, gas
lobbying activity still only becomes profitable when the CO2 price reaches a level of
around 10e. Once this threshold has been reached, lobbying activity is carried out
frequently and keeps the CO2 price at a level of 10e until the last ten years when it
stars increasing again. When introducing a wind energy premium of 20e into such
a system, a 25% renewable share in the energy mix can be reached. We performed
a range of sensitivity checks with respect to the interest rate, volatility, trend of
permit prices, gas price, the cost of lobbying, and effectiveness of lobbying. The
interest rate plays a crucial role since a higher interest rate discounts the future
more, and leads to a less favorable investment environment for wind power since
this power type becomes more profitable over time relative to gas power. A lower
interest rate has the opposite effect. The volatility also impacted the results in a
significant fashion since a higher volatility may lead to low permit prices in later
periods, rendering gas power more profitable. Changing the price of gas also has
a significant impact on the investment decisions, however the changes need to be
substantial. Such rapid and large changes of the gas price are rather unlikely in the
foreseeable future.
Even though our model is a partial equilibrium analysis we gave an indication of
the social welfare cost attached to the different scenarios. Under the assumption that
a 5% permit price trend adequately captures the value of the negative environmental
externality caused by CO2 emissions, allowing for either type of lobbying implies a
welfare loss. The scenarios clearly showed that a 5% trend coupled with currently low
permit prices is not sufficient in order to induce investment into renewable energy.
With the introduction of a feed-in tariff like support mechanism for wind power, the
amount of renewable energy increased substantially. This support, however, comes
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at a cost. In addition to the cost for the subsidy, wind power is the more expensive
energy type leading to higher cost for society. Furthermore, costly wind lobbying
activity becomes profitable implying further cost. Without a global emission market
carbon leakage can become an issue. Increased high cost renewable production in
one part of the world may cause energy intensive production to move elsewhere or
even increase incentives to use fossil resources via reduced market prices due to less
consumption from renewable intensive countries.
The quantitative results of our model should be treated with care, since the 5%
trend is the current best guess of what a future permit might like look like. The same
argument applies to the lobbying cost. We performed sensitivity checks for both
values in order to show how strongly these parameters affect the outcome. We also
showed that the interest rate plays an important role, which also depends on market
forces which cannot be predicted. Therefore, it is the general direction and relative
size our results indicate which are the main result of our study, not specific year for
year values. We have abstracted from cartel and oligopoly issues which certainly
play a role in the permit market. Also, a thorough general equilibrium welfare
analysis of the implied social costs are beyond the scope of our study. Addressing
these issues is left for future research.
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Chapter 5
Come Dine with Me: a
Game-Theoretic Analysis
5.1 Introduction
Since its first broadcasting in 2005, the British TV-Show Come Dine with Me gained
great popularity and is well established by now. Today, identical or very similar
formats of the show are televised in 32 countries world-wide,1 and often reach a quite
remarkable number of viewers, as for example in Germany, Turkey and Israel.2 In
this show, four or five amateur chefs take turns in cooking and hosting a dinner party
for each other during the course of a week. All contestants have to announce their
menu before the first dinner, and cannot change it afterwards. After each dinner
night the performance of the chef is evaluated by his contenders on a scale from 0
to 10, with 10 representing the highest score. The individual evaluations remain
undisclosed until the show is eventually broadcast (several weeks or months later).
The contestant with the highest cumulative score is the winner and obtains the cash
prize of £1,000. If several contestants receive the same score the prize is split equally
among those. Irrespective of the outcome of the contest, every contestant receives
the same fixed amount to cover cooking and travelling expenses.
Although Come Dine with Me is a very popular TV-format, there are only few
studies that investigate the strategic and behavioural aspects of this show. Notable
exceptions are Haigner et al. (2010) who consider sequential position effects in the
German version. These authors find that a negative position effect exists for the
first competitor. Moreover, Ahmed (2011) compares the means of points given
in the Swedish version of the show, and finds no significant differences between
voting behaviour of men and women. While there is apparently little research on
Come Dine with Me, there is a small literature on other TV-formats exploring these
shows from a behavioural point of view: see, for example, Bennett and Hickman
(1993); Berk et al. (1996); Anwar (2012); Page and Page (2010); van den Assem
et al. (2011). Yet, similar game shows, such as Shopping Queen Four weddings,
or Big Brother have not been investigated in a rigorous economic fashion either.
The setting of Shopping Queen and Four weddings are closely related to Come Dine
with Me: contestants rate each other’s outfit or wedding during the course of a
week, ratings remain concealed during the show and the winner receives a grand
prize. Also, Big Brother is similar to Come Dine with Me as contestants’ voting
behaviour is anonymous for the other contestants but public to the television viewer.
Furthermore, contestants may vote each other out of the game, and the winner is
paid a cash prize at the end of the show.
The specific (strategic) structure of these shows can also be found in economic
1For example, the German format is called Das perfekte Dinner (since March 2006); the French,
Un Dıˆner Presque Parfait (since February 2008); the Turkish, Yemekteyiz (since October 2008)
etc.
2See, for example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Come Dine with Me.
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life: peer review evaluation systems (peer assessments), in particular peer ratings
and peer rankings, in firms are a fine example. In these systems, employees mutually
evaluate the performance of co-workers within the same department or division. The
evaluations remain anonymous, but the results are usually used to measure the over-
all performance of an employee determining bonus payments or promotion. Thus,
a multifaceted task is evaluated by peers, and the resulting aggregate evaluation
determines monetary and/or professional success.
Due to the observed relevance of mutual evaluation games, we believe this kind
of setting to be both practically relevant and theoretically interesting. In view
of the sparse economic literature on this type of a setting, we explore the game-
theoretic structure of mutual evaluation games, contrast the theoretical results with
actual behaviour in Come Dine with Me, finally provide potential explanations why
contestants submit evaluation profiles in accordance with game theoretic predictions.
As a first, though preliminary step, we argue why Come Dine with Me (and simi-
lar set-ups) may be identified as simultaneous, aggregative, n-player strategic games
with n− 1 dimensional strategy sets, and then intuitively explain a player’s result-
ing incentive structure. Since individual evaluations remain undisclosed until the
show is broadcast, participants do not know the evaluations received by antecedent
chefs, and can thus not condition their evaluations on past voting behaviour of their
competitors. With this lack of information, evaluations are made as if they had
been chosen simultaneously. For this reason, we may interpret the choice of mutual
evaluations as a strategic game played simultaneously by five players (contestants)
each of which selects a score vector of length four with elements between 0 and 10,
representing the respective evaluations of the other players. Then, since for each
player the chances of winning are increasing in his own total score but decreasing in
the total score of his contenders, the payoff of a player is non-increasing in the eval-
uations attributed to either of his competitors. Consequently, it is not in a player’s
interest to award some other player some positive score.
Thus, if contestants are solely interested in their own payoff without any fairness
considerations or social preferences, one would expect contestants to rate each other
with zero scores, as this would not only serve to minimize the chances of winning for
the other contestants, but can also be achieved at zero (pecuniary) cost for the eval-
uating player. Furthermore, the evaluator does not have to fear punishment from his
peers, since his voting behaviour is unobservable while the voting process continues,
but is observable by the public upon broadcasting later. However, although there
is neither the possibility of punishment nor even of identification during the game,
zero evaluations are very rarely observed in the show. For this reason we have to
look for possible explanations for non-zero evaluations awarded by participants in
actual contests.
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It is worthwhile to emphasise that we exclusively focus on the evaluation part
of the show, taking the menu setting strategy as exogenous. This restriction of the
strategy space seems to be appropriate as the menu has to be chosen in advance, in a
situation of complete ignorance of the other contestants and the order of cooking, and
without any commitment for the subsequent evaluation game. Also, the selection
of menus requires the formulation of believes about the other competitors’ tastes
rendering the complete menu-selection-evaluation game to be a Bayesian game of a
rather complex type. Since the subsequent evaluation game can strategically and
chronologically be separated from the menu-selection decisions, the menu choices
are disregarded here—and the pure evaluation game is the object of our analysis.
Correspondingly, this paper serves a threefold task. Firstly, we define a class
of games, the class of mutual evaluation games (MEG), and show that Come Dine
with Me belongs to this class. Secondly, we explore the Nash equilibria of this class
of games, and demonstrate that any MEG, and therefore Come Dine with Me in
particular, has a unique Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies where each
player chooses an evaluation vector with all elements equal to the lowest possible
evaluation level, which equals zero in the case of Come Dine with Me. That is, in this
equilibrium all players evaluate all other players with zero scores, and we therefore
refer to this equilibrium as the zero equilibrium henceforth. In addition, any MEG
has numerous other (weak) Nash equilibria with non-zero evaluation profiles.
Due to the apparently salient features of the zero equilibrium—an equilibrium
in (weakly) dominant strategies and choices of polar strategies—it may be regarded
as highly appealing, standing out against any other equilibrium. Yet, in actual
shows contestants typically do neither play the zero equilibrium, nor do they end
up in any other Nash equilibrium. Consequently, even though the zero equilibrium
has apparently appealing features, and is thus a canonical candidate for a strategy-
tuple to be played, contestant do not choose to follow this strategy. Accordingly,
we discuss possible explanations for this phenomenon, which may be attributed to
social or behavioural aspects. Also, our discussion points upon potential directions
for future research on contestants’ actual behaviour in TV shows, or more broadly,
on the behaviour in publicly observed games of the MEG class.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we define the MEG
class and formalise the show Come Dine with Me as such a strategic game. In Sec-
tion 5.3 we characterise the Nash equilibria of a MEG, and in particular of Come
Dine with Me. Subsequently, in Section 5.4 we describe observed behaviour of con-
testants in actual shows and then provide possible explanations for why contestants
fail to achieve some Nash equilibrium. Finally, we provide some concluding remarks
in Section 5.5.
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5.2 The Model
In this section we formally introduce a class of strategic games called mutual evalu-
ation games (MEG), and then show that the game Come Dine with Me belongs to
this class. Also, we argue that a MEG is a special type of an aggregative game.
We use the following notation. N := {1, 2, . . . , n} denotes the set of players. (For
Come Dine with Me we have n = 5.) In this game, each player assigns to each other
player an evaluation or score, represented by a natural number between 0 and k
(for Come Dine with Me k equals 10).3 However, a player may not evaluate herself,
which is formally captured by requiring player i to assign to herself the minimum
evaluation level, i. e. a zero score. Accordingly, the strategy set of player i, i ∈ N is
given by
Si := {s | s = (s1, . . . , sn)T, sj ∈ N(k) for j 6= i, and si = 0},
where N(k) := {0, 1, . . . , k} represents the set of natural numbers up to k, k ∈ N.
Note carefully that a strategy (or action) of each player is not a scalar but an n-
dimensional vector: a strategy si of player i consists of n evaluations sij ∈ N(k), one
for each player j ∈ N , including the (notional) self-evaluation sii ≡ 0.
While si denotes some n-dimensional strategy of player i, we write S := (s1, . . . , sn)
for the n-tuple of n-dimensional strategies, so that S may be identified with the ma-
trix
S = (s1, . . . , sn) =
s
1
1 · · · sn1
...
...
s1n · · · snn
 ,
where all diagonal elements of S equal zero, i. e., sii = 0, ∀i ∈ N . Note that the i–th
column of S represents the strategy of player i, while the i–th row of S represents the
evaluations received by player i. Accordingly we may denote by p :=
∑
j∈N s
j the
vector of total valuations received by (and from) all players; and by p−i :=
∑
j 6=i s
j
the vector of total valuations received from all players but i. Observe that p = S ·e,
where e := (1, . . . , 1)T, so that p is a linear function, viz the sum, of the strategies
(s1, . . . , sn).4
Come Dine with Me is, as well as any game of the class we are considering,
a the-winner-takes-it-all contest where the prize v (v ∈ R+ \ {0}) is assigned to
the player who receives the highest total evaluation; with a symmetric tie-breaking
3More generally we could allow for the set of possible evaluation values to be some closed subset
of R+. Yet for the sake of tangibility, we prefer to present our results for a finite set of evaluation
values, with 0 representing the lowest evaluation score; the generalisation to some arbitrary closed
set is straightforward, though.
4More formally, p may be defined as the linear function p :M(n, n,N(k))→ Nn(nk) : S 7→ S · e,
where M(n1, n2,N(k)) denotes the set of N(k)-valued n1 × n2–matrices.
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rule, that is, in case of a tie the prize is split equally among the winners.5 Let
p¯(S) := max{p1(S), . . . pn(S)} denote the maximum total evaluation received by
some player for valuations S; and let W (S) := {j | pj(S) = p¯(S)} denote the winning
players (players with maximal total evaluations) under S. Using the symbol 1 to
denote the indicator function, the payoff of player i is defined by the payoff function
ui :×
i∈N
Si → R+ : S 7→ ui(S) = 1{pi(S)=p¯(S)}
v
|W (S)| ,
and the payoff vector u(S) ≡ (u1, . . . un)(S) is defined accordingly.—With these
elements at hand, we can now define the class of games we wish to work with.
Definition 1. A strategic form game Γ of the form Γ = 〈N, (Si)i∈N , (ui)i∈N〉 with
 a non-empty, finite set of players N ,
 a collection of (n-dimensional) non-empty strategy sets Si
 and a collection of payoff functions ui (together with a positive prize z),
as defined above, is called a mutual evaluation game (MEG).
Obviously, the game Come Dine with Me is a MEG with n = 5, k = 10 (that is,
with k + 1 = 11 evaluation levels) and v = 1000£.
Observe that an evaluation game has a special feature: The payoff of each player
depends only on the total scores of all players, i. e. on the vector p = S · e, but
not single scores, collected in matrix S. Accordingly, the payoff of player i can be
written as a function of her own strategy si and of the sum of the strategies of the
other players, p−i or, more precisely, p−i(S−i):
ui(S) = ui(si,S−i) =: u˜i(si,p−i),
where, with the usual sloppiness, we write S = (si,S−i). Due to this feature, Come
Dine with Me is an (n-dimensional) aggregative game—and thus the results obtained
in the literature for this type of a game apply here.6
In the next section we characterise the Nash equilibria of a MEG, and illustrate
our result by means of three examples.
5In Come Dine with Me the prize v equals 1000 £; in Das perfekte Dinner, 1600 EUR. However,
we may consider any arbitrary but fixed amount v > 0.
6For the theory of aggregative games, though with scalar strategies, see Corcho´n (1994) and
Jensen (2010).
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5.3 Nash-Equilibria of Mutual Evaluation Games
Since total valuation received by player i, pi, is linearly increasing in the evaluations
awarded to her by the other players, si ≡ (s1i , . . . , sni ) (i-th row of S), the payoff
of player i is weakly increasing in si. In contrast, the payoff of player j is weakly
decreasing in pi (i 6= j) and thus in sji—irrespective of the strategies chosen by the
other players S−j. Consequently, for each player it is a weakly dominant strategy
to evaluate all players at the lowest level available, that is at level zero, implying
that S = (0, . . . ,0) constitutes a Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies,
with resulting payoffs u(0, . . . ,0) = (v, . . . , v)/n. evaluate all other players with
zero scores, and we therefore refer to this—Accordingly, we refer to this equilibrium
as the zero equilibrium.—Since every MEG has a dominant strategy equilibrium, a
Nash equilibrium consequently exists in any MEG. However, there are also other,
non-zero Nash equilibria, as the following simple example shows.
Example 1. Let N := {1, 2, 3} (i. e., n = 3), and let Si := {s | s = (s1, s2, s3)T, sj ∈
N(1) for j 6= i, and si = 0}. Thus, each player has |Si| = 4 strategies, for example,
the strategy set of player 1 equals
S1 =

00
0
 ,
01
0
 ,
00
1
 ,
01
1

 .
This game has four equilibria:
S∗1 =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , S∗2 =
0 1 10 0 0
0 0 0
 , S∗3 =
0 0 01 0 1
0 0 0
 , S∗4 =
0 0 00 0 0
1 1 0
 ,
with total scores p(S∗1) = (0, 0, 0)
T, p(S∗2) = (2, 0, 0)
T, p(S∗3) = (0, 2, 0)
T and
p(S∗4) = (0, 0, 2)
T, and payoffs u(S∗1) =
1
3
(v, v, v), u(S∗2) = (v, 0, 0), u(S
∗
3) = (0, v, 0)
and u(S∗4) = (0, 0, v).
The next example demonstrates that the number of equilibria rises quickly as
we increase the number of evaluation levels, and thus the strategy set.
Example 2. This example extends Example 1 by allowing for three rather than two
evaluation levels, i. e., Si := {s | s = (s1, s2, s3)T, sj ∈ N(2) for j 6= i, and si = 0},
where N(2) := {0, 1, 2}. Accordingly, each player has |Si| = |N(2)|(n−1) = 32 = 9
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strategies. For example, the strategy set of player 1 equals
S1 =

00
0
 ,
00
1
 ,
00
2
 ,
01
0
 ,
01
1
 ,
01
2
 ,
02
0
 ,
02
1
 ,
02
2

 .
This game has 55 equilibria, which consist of 12 different types in the sense that
permutations of the players “names” generate all of the 52 equilibria. These 12
types look as follows, assuming that player 3 is the winner of the contest.
S∗a =
0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 , S∗b =
0 0 00 0 0
1 1 0
 , S∗c =
0 0 00 0 1
2 0 0
 , S∗d =
0 0 00 0 0
1 2 0
 ,
S∗e =
0 0 01 0 0
2 1 0
 , S∗h =
0 0 00 0 0
2 2 0
 , S∗j =
0 0 01 0 0
2 2 0
 , S∗l =
0 1 01 0 0
2 2 0
 ,
S∗m =
0 0 00 0 1
2 1 0
 , S∗p =
0 0 00 0 1
2 2 0
 , S∗r =
0 1 00 0 1
2 2 0
 , S∗s =
0 0 10 0 1
2 2 0
 .
These examples illustrate our results: Any mutual evaluation game possesses a
Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies where each player plays si = 0;
and we henceforth refer to this equilibrium as the zero equilibrium. Beyond this,
any mutual evaluation game has many non-zero (weak) Nash equilibria, and their
number grows rapidly in both the number of evaluation levels and the number of
players. Moreover, for a non-zero tuple of strategies to constitute an equilibrium, the
difference in total scores between any loser (non-winner) and some other player must
be sufficiently large so as to guarantee that a loser cannot profitably deviate. For
the same reason, in any non-zero equilibrium each winner evaluates all co-winners
(split win)—if there are any—with a zero score. More formally we arrive at:
Proposition 1. Any mutual evaluation game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium in
weakly dominant strategies where each player plays si = 0 (the zero equilibrium),
with resulting payoffs ui(S) = v/n, and multiple non-zero, weak Nash equilibria.
Any equilibrium is characterised by two conditions:
1. Each winner assigns 0 to all other winners, i. e., sij = 0,∀i, j ∈ W (S).
2. For each loser i there is at least one other player j (who may be a loser
or a winner) such that the difference between the total evaluations of j,
pj(S)—which in case j happens to be a winner equals p¯(S)—and her own
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total evaluation, pi(S), exceeds the evaluation which i awarded to j, that is,
∀i ∈ N \W (S), ∃j ∈ N : pj(S)− pi(S) > sij.
The first property guarantees that a winner cannot increase her payoff by reduc-
ing the number of co-winners. Consequently, there must be a unique winner, unless
the mutual evaluations of all winners equal zero. Observe, though, that this does
not rule out that there are two or more winners in equilibrium. The second property
ensures that even if loser i considers to reduce her evaluations of (some or all) other
players to zero, there is at least one player who still has total higher evaluation than
player i—so that it does not pay for player i to deviate from her chosen strategy.
The following example illustrates this.
Example 3. Consider the game Come Dine with Me, that is a MEG with n = 5
players and 11 evaluation levels, i. e., sij ∈ N(10). Assume that total evaluations
amount to p(S) = (20, 28, 12, 29, 5)T—so player 4 is the unique winner. Consider
player 1 with strategy s1 = (0, 5, 3, 10, 1)T. If player 1 reduces her award of player 4
to s˜14 = 0, player 4 is no longer the winner of the game, and player 1 has a higher
total evaluation than has player 4. Yet, player 1 still does not belong to the group
of winners, for player 1 cannot avoid having a lower total evaluation than player 2
has (who is not a winner under S though). This is easily seen by subtracting the
evaluations of player 1 from the total evaluations obtained by the players under S:
p(S)− s1 = (20, 23, 9, 19, 4)T. Accordingly, player 1 has no incentive to unilaterally
deviate from her chosen strategy s1.—If a similar argument holds for the other
players, S constitutes a (weak) Nash equilibrium.
5.4 Discussion of Observed Behaviour
In the previous section we have shown that the TV show Come Dine with Me,
interpreted as a non-cooperative game in evaluation profiles,7 belongs to a class of
games which we labelled mutual evaluation games (MEG). Furthermore, any MEG,
and the game Come Dine with Me in particular, possesses one Nash equilibrium
in weakly dominant strategies, the so-called zero equilibrium, where each player
uses a vector of zero evaluations, and numberless weak Nash equilibria, where at
least two players play non-zero strategy profiles. We now explore actual behaviour
of participants in the German version of Come Dine with Me called Das perfekte
7More precisely, that part of Come Dine with Me where players evaluate each other’s dinner
party may be interpreted as a simultaneous non-cooperative game, i. e. a strategic game with almost
perfect information, between the participants where their strategic variables are the evaluations.
We focus on these evaluation strategies and abstract, in particular, from including the menu-
selection decisions as part of the strategic game.
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Dinner, and contrast our theoretical results with this observed behaviour. We then
provide possible explanations for the prevailing off-equilibrium behaviour.
In the German format, no player (contestant) has ever played a zero evaluation
vector in either of the 212 rounds played between 2006 and 2011, and accordingly the
zero equilibrium has never been realised.8 This is a remarkable observation as the
zero equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies, i. e. the zero-
evaluation vector constitutes a weakly best-reply for each player irrespective of the
strategies chosen by the other players. In this sense, the choice of the zero-evaluation
vector represents an apparently attractive strategy as it is (weakly) beneficial for
any player, and it also yields the potentially largest payoff gain among all available
evaluation strategies for any given strategy profile of the other players. For this
reason, the zero equilibrium may veritably be regarded as highly appealing, standing
out against any other Nash equilibrium, of which numberless exist.
Remarkably, the zero equilibrium, i. e. the equilibrium where all players choose
si = 0, has never been played in 212 rounds of Das perfekte Dinner. Furthermore,
neither did non-zero equilibria emerge on a regular basis: In fact, only in one round
has a non-zero equilibrium been played. This implies that in 211 rounds a contestant
not receiving some prize money could have attained a larger prize by evaluating his
contenders at lower scores. The presence of the potential for profitable deviation
were so ubiquitous that even winners could increase their payoff in 33 rounds where
the win was split among two (29 cases), three (3 cases) and four players (1 case). The
possibilities for profitable deviation were not only omnipresent, but also so significant
that even the very last ranked contestant could have attained an exclusive win in
43.88% and a shared win in 12.26% of the cases; and only in two cases deviating
(by losers) had maximally brought about a split win only. In sum, equilibria are
attained very rarely, and in this sense off-equilibrium behaviour is the rule rather
than an exception in the German version of Come Dine with Me; and, in particular,
the canonical candidate, the zero equilibrium, has never been played.
The most immediate explanation for this off-equilibrium behaviour is that with
11 evaluation levels (namely with levels 0, 1, ..., 10) and five players the set of pos-
sible strategy profiles consists of 1120 ≈ 672.75× 1018 different evaluation matrices,
and accordingly the set of (weak) Nash equilibria is extraordinary large. Since dur-
ing the show a contestant does not know the evaluations made (strategies chosen)
by other contestants, and the number of non-zero equilibria is huge, there is vir-
tually no chance for participants to coordinate on any of these (weak) equilibria.
Consequently, a realisation of any of these non-zero equilibria may be attributed to
8The statistics we use are available in disaggregated form from the homepage of “Das perfekte
Dinner” of the German TV-channel VOX broadcasting: http://www.vox.de/kochen/das-perfekte-
dinner/details.
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accident rather than to intention or coordination—and, in fact, an equilibrium was
played only once.
Since the zero equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium in (weakly) dominant strategies,
and may thus be regarded as highly appealing, we might expect participants to focus
on this equilibrium. As this does not come about, there must be other factors which
prevent participants from playing the zero equilibrium. The literature may provide
several potential explanations for this behaviour, which we will now discuss: The
impact of social pressure and reputation mechanisms, bandwagon effects, inequality
aversion and sequential voting effects.
Concerning social pressure and reputation effects, a starting point is to realise
that the Come Dine with Me show has some common features with joy-of-destruction
games.9 In these games, a player has the opportunity to reduce another player’s
wealth at some small cost without standing to gain anything except for the po-
tential joy of destruction. One can consider the Come Dine with Me show as a
variant of such a setting: Starting from a fair evaluation as the reference point,
which regularly requires strictly positive evaluations, a contestant may choose to
reduce his evaluation of the dinner of some or all other participants just for the joy
of destruction (which may have its root in malevolence or enviousness). Clearly,
a contestant may benefit from an under-evaluation of the performance of his co-
contestants, but in those cases where a player does not obtain a higher payoff by
decreasing another contestant’s evaluation, Come Dine with Me features similarity
with a joy-of-destruction game.
Moreover, a strategy of under-evaluation, and in particular the zero strategy,
can be played in anonymity during the show, so that a destructive strategy remains
undisclosed in mediis. Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) and Abbink and Herrmann (2011)
conduct joy-of-destruction experiments, where there is a chance that burning money
remains hidden. They find that money burning rates increase significantly when
there is a degree of anonymity involved. However, in the Come Dine with Me show
disaggregated voting behaviour will be made public to both the other contestants
and millions of viewers about three months after the contest when the show is even-
tually broadcast. Thus, there is a delayed publicity effect. In his seminal article
Bernheim (1994, p. 844) concludes: “When popularity is sufficiently important rela-
tive to intrinsic utility (defined as utility directly derived from consumption), many
individuals conform to a single, homogeneous standard of behaviour, despite het-
erogeneous underlying preferences”. Therefore, one potential explanation for the
off-equilibrium behaviour in the actual show is that publicity keeps people from
playing the zero strategy. In this vein, Holla¨nder (1990) and Benabou and Tirole
9For a general description of joy of destruction games and some experimental results see for
example, Zizzo and Oswald (2001); Zizzo (2003).
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(2006) provide further evidence that such an effect might play an important role.
Beyond publicity effects, people may condition their present behaviour on previ-
ously observed behaviour—and in this sense, bandwagon effects may arise. Aardema
et al. (1977) show that contestants condition their evaluations on evaluations given
in previous shows. Consequently, if contestants observe relatively high evaluations
in shows already broadcast, this may affect their present voting behaviour as they
do not want to endanger their reputation by deviating from an established social
norm. Similarly, Young (1996) finds that stable focal points, such as, for example,
a 50:50 division in a bargaining game, often evolve over time until they become
focal eventually. In this way, a social standard may be established in initial shows
requiring contestants to refrain from playing the zero strategy. If this implicit rule
is accepted—again implicitly—by subsequent contestants, this might explain why
we never observe the zero equilibrium.
Furthermore, inequality aversion of contestants might be relevant. Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) introduce a utility function based on inequality aversion to explain
the behaviour in different experiments. They argue that people are averse of out-
comes that are distant from a previously established social standard, in particular
with respect to negative deviations. For the setting of Come Dine with Me this
implies that contestants are more willing to give evaluations which are too positive
rather than too negative, relative to a social standard calling for fair evaluations.
The average evaluation in the German version of the show between 2006-2011 is
7.57 points, and we rarely observe any evaluations below 4. Moreover, a positive
bias attributable to inequality aversion may provide a possible explanation for this
generous evaluation behaviour. Both reasons may contribute to explaining why con-
testants rarely play strategies with low evaluations which might actually improve
their chances of winning considerably.
Finally, the sequential effect already recognized by Haigner et al. (2010) for Das
perfekte Dinner and by Page and Page (2010) for the Idol series10 may provide an-
other explanation for off-equilibrium behaviour. Both articles find that contestants
performing later in the respective show receive higher evaluations. One explanation
for this effect is that later contestants adapt to previous performances via so-called
direction-of-comparison effects: “It appears that judges form an impression of each
new option by comparing it to those that preceded it. Using that option’s features
as a ‘checklist,’ more weight is given to unique ones than to ones shared with pre-
vious options. This unidirectional comparison process produces increasing ratings
in options with unique positive features, and decreasing ratings when options have
unique negative features.” (see Bruine de Bruin and Keren, 2003, p. 91). Contes-
10The Idol series is broadcast in UK under the title “Pop Idol”, in the US as “American Idol”
and in Germany as “Deutschland sucht den Superstar”.
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tants cannot change their menu in the Come Dine with Me show once the contest
has started, and the skill of a chef is unlikely to change significantly over the course
of the contest week. Hence, the only way for a contestant to adapt his behaviour in
response to the performance of his precursors is to invest more money and effort to
enhance decoration, to engage an artist for a performance during the dinner etc. If
these improvements are performed, contestants may induce an upward shift in the
perceived socially acceptable evaluation—and sequential effects of this type can help
to explain why we do not observe low evaluations.
5.5 Conclusion
In this paper we looked at the TV-Show Come Dine with Me from a strategic per-
spective. To this end, we interpreted and modelled this show as a simultaneous
non-cooperative game with purely self-regarding preferences of the players (viz. con-
testants) and mutual evaluation levels as their strategic variables. We showed that
Come Dine with Me belongs to a class of games to which we refer as mutual evalua-
tion games (MEG). Each MEG possesses multiple Nash equilibria, each of which is
characterised by two conditions: (1) Each winner assigns a zero score (lowest possi-
ble score) to all other co-winners, if there are any; (2) For each loser there is at least
one other player (who may be a loser or a winner) such that even if this loser were
to evaluate all other players with a zero score, there is still (at least) one contestant
who has a higher total score. Thus, in equilibrium, any winner cannot reduce the
number of co-winners (condition 1); while any loser may affect the set of winners,
but cannot accomplish to become a member of the group of winners (condition 2).
We showed that in a game with three contestants (players) and two evaluation
levels has four Nash equilibria. Adding one additional evaluation level, we find that
the resulting three-player game with three evaluation levels possesses 55 equilibria—
and this number quickly soars as the number of players or evaluation levels increases.
Also, irrespective of the number of players and the number of evaluation levels, any
MEG possesses a unique Nash equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies: the zero
equilibrium in which all players evaluate each other with zero scores. As long as we
disregard (potential) social preferences and fairness considerations and, thus, focus
on the monetary gains exclusively, this zero equilibrium may arguably be regarded
as the appealing equilibrium, standing out against any other equilibrium.
We contrasted our theoretical results with actual behaviour in the German ver-
sion of the show. The zero equilibrium has never been played in any show during
2006-2011. In fact, only in four cases did a contestant evaluate another contestant
with a zero score. Furthermore, players typically failed to reach any equilibrium:
only in one out of 212 rounds an equilibrium is attained. In this sense, off-equilibrium
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behaviour is the standard result observed in actual behaviour. Considering that the
number of equilibria in a 5 player/11 evaluations space is remarkably large, one
explanation for this observed off-equilibrium behaviour is that contestants simply
cannot coordinate on any equilibrium. However, contrasting the average evaluation
of 7.57 with the arguably appealing zero equilibrium, it becomes clear that there
must be other factors than payoff concerns, that bring about this differential.
We provided four different potential explanations for this phenomenon: The im-
pact of social pressure and reputation mechanisms, bandwagon effects, inequality
aversion and sequential voting effects. We showed that all effects can help to ex-
plain off-equilibrium behaviour and the seemingly positive evaluation bias. All of
these explanations, if the proved to be correct, suggest that the alleged identity of
monetary payoff and utility does not apply here, and that the players’ objective
functions must be adapted accordingly. With suitably modified objective functions
we obtain a new game, an equilibrium of which may then provide more accurate
predictions for real bahaviour. Yet, as long as the game has several equilibria the
equilibrium-selection problem still applies.
In sum, the goal of this paper was to provide a game theoretical background
for this type of mutual evaluation games, and to provide potential explanations for
actual behaviour compared to the game-theoretical predictions. Future research on
this topic should focus on empirically measuring the impact of factors that may help
to explain actual behaviour in a mutual evaluation game such as Come Dine with
Me.
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Chapter 6
Pro-Social behavior in the TV
format Come Dine with Me: An
empirical investigation.
6.1 Introduction
Interaction between human beings is, to a large extent, governed by social norms that
have evolved over time and have been instilled in us since childhood. In the absence
of compliance to social norms, everyday interaction would be difficult because every
situation would require the persons involved to establish acceptable behavior anew
or to coordinate regarding some mutually acceptable behavior. Compliance with
a social norm can be enforced through so-called moralistic punishment. Moralistic
punishment is defined as: “. . . the enforcement of social norms by outraged but
otherwise not directly affected third parties” (Carpenter and Matthews (2012), p.
555). Another important dimension that leads people to adhere to norms is the
potential loss of reputation in the eyes of their peers, often termed social approval
(Benabou and Tirole, 2003, 2006; Bernheim, 1994; Holla¨nder, 1990). In his seminal
article, Bernheim (1994) postulates: “When popularity is sufficiently important
relative to intrinsic utility (defined as utility directly derived from consumption),
many individuals conform to a single, homogenous standard of behavior, despite
heterogeneous underlying preferences” (p. 844). Bernheim’s model also allows for
deviations from a norm for agents with extreme preferences. This explains the need
for third party punishment, because in certain situations the intrinsic utility gain
may lead to deviations from the norm.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the influence of social approval, reputation,
and personal traits on the voting behavior of contestants in the German version of
the TV show “Come Dine With Me.” In order to address these questions, we employ
a dataset including shows from the years 2006-2011. The German version is called
“Das perfekte Dinner,” and for clarity of exposition, we will refer to the German
version of the show as “The Perfect Dinner” in the rest of this paper. The TV show
offers a unique setting to test the impact of these factors because contestants’ ratings
are concealed, and therefore, are unobservable by the co-contestants during the show
and are not revealed to the public and contestants until the final broadcast. Thus,
due to the fact that voting behavior is unobservable during the show, one might
expect contestants to behave selfishly in order to win a monetary prize, if it is
assumed that they do not care about any social effects. Yet there are various other
factors that may interact with voting behavior having a social component, such as
the order in which the contestants cook, whether or not a person has already cooked,
and the social similarity of the contestants. In order to assess the influence of these
factors, we estimate several different regression models that explain the evaluation
scores a cook receives from an evaluator.
Our work adds to the literature addressing the impact of social factors on eco-
nomic decisions in several ways. First, we have a richer dataset than previous studies
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on the TV show “The Perfect Dinner,” and thus, are able to explore effects stemming
from social and reputational effects in a more robust fashion. Furthermore, we go
beyond preceding studies by investigating new issues such as: the effect of objective
sophistication, social similarity between persons, the effect of past voting behavior,
and the effect of a prior performance. Second, we supply empirical evidence for
theoretical models related to the impact of social factors on economic decision mak-
ing. By addressing a range of potential social factors which has not been examined
previously in this context, this paper can serve as input in a range of theoretical
specifications. We find that reputational factors do not play a role. In contrast,
the social similarity between persons, whether a person already has cooked, and
the order in which contestants cook all play a significant role in explaining voting
behavior. Furthermore, objective sophistication also has a significant impact and
renders our results more robust than previous approaches. The rest of the paper
is structured as follows: Section 2 describes in detail the rules and the course of
action in the TV show “The Perfect Dinner” and offers an overview of the economic
literature related to behavior in TV shows. In section 3, we describe our data and
formulate our hypotheses regarding contestants’ behavior. In section 4, we explain
our econometric approach, which is followed by a discussion of our results in section
5. Finally, we conclude in section 6.
6.2 Description of ”The Perfect Dinner” and lit-
erature review
The original format of the show was first broadcast in Great Britain in 2005 under
the title “Come Dine With Me.” Since then, identical or very similar formats have
been picked up for broadcasting in 32 countries worldwide1, and reach a large audi-
ence2 in their respective countries. The German version of the show, “The Perfect
Dinner,” has the following rules: Each day, one of the five contestants cooks for the
whole group. Thus, the overall time span of one round is five days. The dinner is
prepared at the respective home of the cook. Contestants must announce the menu
they plan to cook before the beginning of the show and cannot change it afterwards.
Furthermore, they do not have any influence on the order of cooking, which is de-
termined by the TV-Chanel producing the show. Each contestant receives 600e for
expenses before the show. At the end of the respective dinner, the performance of
a cook is rated by his peers on a scale from 0-10, with 10 representing the highest
1For example, the German format is called Das perfekte Dinner (since March 2006); the French,
Un Diner Presque Parfait (since February 2008); the Turkish, Yemekteyiz (since October 2008),
etc.
2See, for example, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Come_Dine_with_Me.
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score. This score does not only reflect the quality of the food, but also the overall
impression of the evening, meaning that the ability of the host to make it an overall
enjoyable experience for the contestants is rated as well. Evaluations are performed
confidentially, so that each contestant has to decide on his evaluation with no knowl-
edge of the evaluations of his competitors. Furthermore, communication regarding
this matter is prevented by the TV crew. Evaluations remain undisclosed until the
show is broadcast, approximately three months later. At the end of the week, the
results, although not detailed individual evaluations, are announced and the contes-
tant with the highest total collective score wins a prize of 1500e. If there is a draw,
the prize is divided equally among the winners.
Despite the great popularity of the show, there are only a few studies that in-
vestigate “The Perfect Dinner” from an economic standpoint. Haigner et al. (2010)
consider the sequential position effects of the German version and find that a nega-
tive position effect exists for the first competitor. Ahmed (2011) compares the means
of points given in the Swedish version of the show and finds no significant differ-
ences between the voting behavior of men and women. citeSchuller2013 consider
the show from a game theoretical point of view. They model it as a simultaneous
non-cooperative game with evaluations as strategic variables and show that, in the
absence of social concerns, there are many Nash-equilibria. Employing part of the
same data set used for this study, they find that players reach a Nash equilibrium
only once and that this equilibrium differs from the zero-equilibrium. Therefore,
non-equilibrium behavior seems to be the rule rather than the exception.
The literature concerning economic behavior on TV shows has seen a signifi-
cant increase, especially in recent years. Bennett and Hickman (1993) study the
show “The Price is Right” with respect to the rationality of decision making and
learning, and find that learning occurs during the show that renders contestants’
behavior more effective from an economic point of view. Berk et al. (1996) study
the same show also with respect to the rationality of agents in the context of the
bounded rationality theory. They also find that the initial behavior of contestants
is sub-optimal from an economic perspective, but improves over time as contes-
tants learn. However, they also show that frequently, rule-of-thumb strategies are
employed because rational expectations strategies seem to be too complex. Anwar
(2012) examines the TV show “Street Smarts,” testing for discrimination, and finds
that non-blacks discriminate against blacks in evaluating their ability to answer cer-
tain types of questions. Because this discrimination does not occur in the general
knowledge category, he concludes that it does not lend support to the statistical dis-
crimination hypothesis. van den Assem et al. (2011) look at cooperative behavior in
the show “Golden Balls” with respect to learning and social interaction. They find
that learning that concerns expected earnings does occur and that people tend to
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show reciprocal preferences. Both factors influence cooperative behavior over time.
Furthermore, the sizes of the potential prizes matter, as higher potential earnings
lead to less cooperation. Page and Page (2010) consider the sequential bias within
the setting of the “Idol” show and find that the data reveal a bias.
6.3 Data Description and Hypotheses
6.3.1 Data description
All data were obtained from the TV channel VOX, which broadcasts “The Perfect
Dinner,” by collecting data from their website and re-watching episodes to obtain
missing data3. The ratings for the show during the time period investigated (2006-
2011) were kindly provided by VOX. We excluded the first 24 weeks of our dataset for
estimating all but one specification of the econometric models, where we test for the
effect of the initial 24 weeks on voting behavior. They are excluded as they represent
the time span between the filming and the broadcast of the first show. Since one of
the factors we want to measure is the impact of past evaluation behavior, we must
exclude this time span in all but one specification because there is no possibility for
contestants to have any knowledge about previous voting behavior prior to the first
broadcast. Without the first 24 weeks, the final sample consists of 3735 cooking
assessments observed in 237 rounds of games. Including the first 24 weeks leads to
4322 observations.
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the descriptive statistics for the variables used in
the econometric analysis, discussed in more detail in section 4. The points given
to the cook by the other contestants are set as a dependent variable (“Points”).
Its distribution is skewed to left which is due to the very rare occurrence of poor
evaluations. The mode and median both take the value of eight and hence are rel-
atively close to the highest possible value. Table 6.2 displays the distribution of
“Points” for the estimation sample. The weekday (Monday-Friday) the contestant
to be evaluated is performing enters the econometric model as a set of four binary
indicators each indicating one weekday (Tuesday-Friday). Monday is the base cat-
egory and therefore does not appear in the table. Since the time schedule does not
vary across rounds, the weekday and the order of cooking are equivalent. That is
cooking on Monday implies cooking first, cooking on Tuesday implies second, etc.
“Evaluator Already Cooked” is equal to one if a participant has already cooked at
the time he must evaluate a dinner and equals zero otherwise. “number of ingre-
dients” represents the absolute number of ingredients used in a diner. “number of
3Part of our data set is available in a disaggregated form on the German TV channel VOX broad-
casting homepage of “Das perfekte Dinner”:http://www.vox.de/kochen/das-perfekte-dinner/
details.
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ingredients2/100” is the square of “number of ingredients”, divided by 100. This
factor of division is used to ensure that the explanatory variables are numerically
of similar magnitude, rendering the estimation procedure more stable and the co-
efficients more easily comparable. “Level” measures the difficulty level, “price” the
price level of menu4 . “Av. evaluation level,” reports the average points given during
the last 24 weeks before a contest. “Av. share viewers” represents the tv-market
share of the respective show. The minimum equals 7.85%, while the maximum is
12.23%. For example, if 10 million people were watching TV on Monday during
the airing of “The Perfect Dinner”, a 10% share implies that 1 Million people were
watching the show. A five percentage point difference might not seem large, but
for a show in the relevant market segment, this represents the difference between
a mediocre and a successful show. “Population” measures the size of the popula-
tion in the town in which the show is being filmed in millions of inhabitants. For
example, the largest city in our sample with 8,1 million inhabitants has a value of
8,1, the smallest with 8000 inhabitants a value of 0,008. “Foreign” accounts for the
filming of the show in locations outside of Germany, the value being 1 if it is outside
and 0 if the show takes place in Germany. “Time” is the number of days since the
first recording of the show divided by 1000. “time2/1000” is the square of “time”
divided by 1000 5. The division factor of 1000 has been chosen in order to ensure
better comparability between the coefficients in our analysis later on. Furthermore,
we report the descriptive statistics on a range of individual characteristics such as
gender, migration status, age, profession and hair color. Besides age, all individual
characteristics are dummy variables. ”dissimilar” measures the social dissimilarity
of the evaluator and the cook, based on the range of individual social character-
istics, listed in table 6.1. The closer the value is to one, the less similar the two
contestants are. In computational terms, “dissimilar” is the rescaled Mahalanobis
distance between the vectors of two participants’ socioeconomic characteristics6.
As a scaled Mahalanobis distance the variable dissimilarity is constructed from
weighted sum of squared (and cross-products of) deviations in the considered so-
cioeconomic characteristics. Hence it is meant to capture a potential effect of overall
socioeconomic proximity between cook and evaluator. One may, however, question a
4The difficulty level and the price level are determined by experts on the website http://www.
kochbar.de.
5The division factor of 1000 is chosen in order to ensure similar magnitudes of the explanatory
variables; see above.
6The Mahalanobis distance (MDij) is defined
√
(xi − xj)′V (x)−1 (xi − xj) with xi and xj de-
noting the column vectors of socioeconomic characteristics of individuals i and j, respectively, and
V(x) denoting the (estimated) variance-covariance matrix of socioeconomic characteristics x. The
variable dissimilar is defined MDij/ max (MD). That is, dissimilar is normalized to one for the
most differential pair of individuals in the sample, while it takes the value of zero for a pair of
individuals who share all considered socioeconomic characteristicshe Mahalanobis
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general effect of dissimilarity and argue that it is rather dissimilarity with respect to
specific characteristics that matters. Moreover, similarity in these relevant charac-
teristics may not have a homogeneous effect on the depended variable. Dissimilarity
with respect to age for example, might result in less complaisant evaluations while
heterogeneousness with respect to gender might result in more positive evaluations.
In order to address this argument, we also estimated specifications that separately
include squared deviations in specific socioeconomic characteristics as explanatory
variables. As most characteristics enter the model as indicators, these variables -
with the exception of age – are dummies indicating a difference with respect the
considered characteristic. Because of (near) collinearity, the data does not allow
for estimating a model with full set squared deviations and we focus on a subset of
characteristics (gender, immigration status, age, hair color), see Table 6.1.
Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean S.D. Median Min Max
Points 7.616 1.363 8 1 10
cooking order
Second 0.203 0.402 0 0 1
Third 0.202 0.401 0 0 1
Fourth 0.200 0.400 0 0 1
fifth 0.193 0.395 0 0 1
evaluator already cooked 0.500 0.500 0 0 1
number of ingredients 52.633 16.945 51 16 134
number of ingredients2/100 30.573 21.594 26.01 2.56 179.56
level 1.874.675 .3459764 2 1 3
price 1.859.798 .3616571 2 1 3
av. evaluation level
7.597 0.272 7.552 7.073 8.123
(previous 24 weeks)
av. share viewers
9.470 1.564 8.332 7.846 12.234
(previous 24 weeks)
population (city of venue) 0.989 1.099 0.580 0.008 8.100
foreign (city of venue) 0.035 0.185 0 0 1
time 1.110 0.491 1.206 0.273 1.908
time2/1000 1.474 1.094 1.454 0.075 3.640
ind. characteristics
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female 0.534 0.499 1 0 1
immigrant 0.074 0.263 0 0 1
age 38.284 11.177 38 18 71
student 0.070 0.255 0 0 1
civil servant 0.032 0.175 0 0 1
artist 0.071 0.256 0 0 1
entrepreneur 0.210 0.408 0 0 1
pensioner 0.006 0.077 0 0 1
employee 0.533 0.499 1 0 1
academic 0.089 0.285 0 0 1
trainee 0.009 0.096 0 0 1
pupil 0.009 0.092 0 0 1
blond 0.377 0.485 0 0 1
dissimilarity
overall dissimilarity
0.344 0.162 0.337 0 1
(Mahalanobis dist.)
female (squared diff.) 0.593 0.491 1 0 1
immigrant (squared diff.) 0.133 0.340 0 0 1
age (squared diff.) 0.262 0.341 0.121 0 2.500
blond (squared diff.) 0.471 0.499 0 0 1
Table 6.2: Distribution of dependent variable (Points)
value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
abs. frequency 1 2 17 53 152 450 1031 1073 643 313
cum. percentage 0.03 0.08 0.54 1.95 6.02 18.07 45.68 74.4 91.62 100
6.3.2 Research Hypotheses
Our hypotheses address several issues which we group into the following categories:
Monetary incentives, reputation, social in-game influences, objective quality, and
personal traits. The main monetary incentive is the cash prize. However, because
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the prize has not changed over the years, the monetary motivation (e.g., change of
the prize) can be disregarded, and thus, extrinsic motivation does not vary across
observations and for this reason cannot be analyzed on basis of our data. To ap-
proximate the impact of reputation on our dependent variable, we consider the
impact of past voting behavior. This hypothesis is derived the work of Bernheim
(1994) and Benabou and Tirole (2006). Bernheim (1994) considers the emergence
of customs or why people tend to conform to certain social standards. His model
explains conformity by comparing the relative value of popularity to intrinsic utility,
and shows that agents with non-extreme preferences choose to conform to a norm
in equilibrium. Benabou and Tirole (2006) consider a model in which people also
care about appearing pro-social, depending on the visibility of their actions. Since
voting behavior is visible to the public once the show is aired, past voting behav-
ior can be considered as a social norm current contestants want to conform to. In
the literature this behavior is often associated with the term “bandwagon” effect
(Aardema et al., 1977). If a high level of evaluations has evolved as a “social” focal
point (Schelling, 1960) over time, this might help to explain the voting behavior of
participants. (Young, 1996) shows that focal points such as a 50:50 split in bar-
gaining situations are not focal right away, but evolve over time and remain stable
afterwards. We control for the influence of past voting behavior by including the
independent variable “Average evaluation level,” which reflects the average points
given over the last 24 weeks. Our first hypothesis is then as follows:
H1: “The higher evaluations have been in the past, the higher
evaluations are today.”
Concerning social in-game influences, we first consider potential direction-of-
comparison effects caused by the sequential voting structure of the show. Direction-
of-comparison effects can influence voting behavior in the following way:
”It appears that judges form an impression of each new option by comparing it to
those that preceded it. Using that option’s features as a ‘checklist,’ more weight is
given to unique ones than to ones shared with previous options. This unidirectional
comparison process produces increasing ratings in options with unique positive fea-
tures, and decreasing ratings when options have unique negative features.” (Bruine
de Bruin and Keren (2003), p. 91).
We use the starting position of a cook to measure this. Haigner et al. (2010) find
that in “The Perfect Dinner,” first day contestants are evaluated significantly more
harshly than contestants who cook later. However, the authors do not control for a
range of effects that we consider: the effect of objective quality, the effect of being
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socially similar to another person, the effect of past voting behavior and the effect of
having already performed. We expect to see an overall positive evaluation bias for
contestants that perform later, since subsequent cooks can adjust the performance
elements of their dinner (e.g., having an artist perform, playing music themselves,
etc.) and gather more information about other contestants (e.g., sympathy or pref-
erences). Of course, unique negative performances of later cooks will lead to a lower
rating, but overall contestants that cook at a later stage in the game have a better
chance to adjust to the expectation of the group. Due to this process we expect
to see an overall positive effect of cooking later. Our second hypothesis is then the
following:
H2: “The later a contestant performs, the higher the evaluations he
receives.”
The variable “Already Cooked” indicates whether the evaluator has competed
before the contestant to be evaluated. This controls for the effect that once a partici-
pant has cooked, he might be more critical of another’s performance since he will not
be evaluated again. Put differently, we are controlling for contestants overestimating
their own performance. This is a recognized phenomenon in the psychological and
economic literature7. Moore and Healy (2008) find that overestimation especially
plays a role when difficult tasks are performed. Arguably, preparing a three course
dinner for 5 persons can be categorized as such a task, and might lead a contestant
to overestimate his own performance. Our third hypothesis is then the following:
H3: “The earlier a contestant performs, the lower the evaluations the
contestant gives to the remaining cooks.”
In order to test for the influence of objective measures, we use the total number
of ingredients used in the three dishes prepared on one day, the price and difficulty
level. Our fourth hypothesis concerning the effect of the objective characteristics of
a dinner is then the following.
H4: “The more sophisticated a performance is, the better the
evaluations.”
Concerning personal traits, we separate our analysis into two parts: In the first
part we consider an aggregate measure of dissimilarity between contestants, mea-
sured by the variable “Overall Dissimilarity”. We expect participants who have
dissimilar social characteristics to give each other lower evaluations. This effect has
been recognized in the experimental economic and psychological literature (Bran˜as
Garza et al., 2010, 2012; Engel, 2011). Our fifth hypothesis is then the following:
7For a good overview on both literature fields, we point the reader to Moore and Healy (2008).
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H5: “The less similar two contestants are, the lower their mutual
evaluations.”
As a second step, we take a closer look at what specific characteristics exert the
strongest influence on the aggregate dissimilarity measure. We will not specify a
range of hypotheses for each characteristic. Instead, we will present a table with
specific results for some traits and their impact on the aggregate measure and discuss
the individual impact each factor has8. The next section presents our econometric
approach in order to answer these questions.
6.4 Econometric Approach
In order to analyze which factors determine the observed evaluation scores, we set
up a variety of regression models. We start with a simple model specification using
ordinary least squares to estimate the effects the explanatory variables exert on the
evaluation scores (“Points”). As a result of the design of the show, the observations
– that is, the assigned scores – are not statistically independent, as one dinner is
evaluated four times and each contestant issues four evaluations. Hence, unobserved
heterogeneity, both at the level of dinners (and respectively, cooks) and at the level
of evaluators, generates a complex pattern of error correlation within each round of
the show. One approach to address this issue is to parametrically model this cor-
relation and to estimate the model using generalized least squares. Although this
approach is efficient given the validity of the distributional assumptions, we follow a
more simple and robust modeling strategy by calculating clustered standard errors
where clustering is at the levels of rounds of the game. Since clustering allows for
arbitrary error correlation within each cluster (Moulton, 1986), clustered standard
errors implicitly account for either source of error correlation. One may, however,
argue that unobserved heterogeneity is not only an issue of error correlation, i.e., ef-
ficiency and correctly estimated standard error, but also matters for the consistency
of the estimation procedure. This applies if the unobserved characteristics of dinners
and evaluators are correlated with the explanatory variables. Given the structure of
the data at hand, one could account for this by estimating a two-way-fixed effects
model (Wansbeek and Kaptyen, 1989) that includes indicators for each dinner and
each evaluator. In addition to being inefficient if individual effects are uncorrelated
with the regressors, the obvious drawback of this approach is that it allows for the
identification of only very few coefficients of interest, that is, those that are neither
constant for dinners/cooks nor for evaluators. In the reference specification the only
two are the coefficients attached to “already cooked” and “dissimilar.” Yet the ef-
8We thank an anonymous referee for pointing us into this direction.
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fects of those variables that do not vary for both dinners and evaluators are already
absorbed in the fixed effects. Interestingly, estimates for the former two coefficients
are similar for ordinary least squares (OLS) and two-way fixed effects. Moreover,
the conventional Hausman test does not favor one-way fixed effects over conven-
tional random effects that explicitly account for the unobserved characteristics of
evaluators. Both results indicate that a correlation of unobserved characteristics and
explanatory variables are unlikely to represent a major problem. This makes per-
fect sense, as several regressors, such as “cooking order,” “dissimilar,” and “share
viewers” are virtually randomly assigned to cooks and evaluators, and hence, by
construction, are uncorrelated with unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, we adhere
to OLS and clustered standard errors9.
One obvious objection to employing OLS is the ordered nature of the dependent
variable, which calls for a parametric ordered regression model such as ordered
probit or ordered logit. As a robustness check, we ran ordered probit regressions
that yielded coefficient estimates very similar to OLS. In addition to this reassuring
result, the argument in favor of employing an ordered model may not be as clear-cut
as it seems at first glance. Although the scores are ordinal, evaluators may view
them as cardinal measures.
Testing for a time effect on the assigned scores is of crucial relevance to the
present analysis. Several different specifications are tried, e.g., time dummies, a
linear trend and both a linear and a quadratic trend, with the latter specification
serving as the preferred specification. Yet not only do changes in the level of assigned
scores matter, but also changes in their variance. To address this issue, we also
estimate a linear regression with multiplicative heteroscedasticity (Harvey, 1976) in
which the error variance is specified either as a linear or as a quadratic function of
time.
The basic model specification includes average evaluations and the average share
of viewers for the previous 24 weeks. This does not allow for considering the initial
24 weeks in the regression analysis since these two variables are undefined for this
subset of observations. As a robustness check we try an alternative specification
that considers all available observations (Model 3). It includes a dummy indicating
the initial period and let the average evaluations and the average share of viewers
enter the model as interactions with one minus this indicator. In this specification
the effect of average evaluations and the average share of viewers is, hence, ‘switched
off’ for the initial period.
One important question in the analysis is whether the true quality of a dinner is
9To take account of the error term’s most likely departure from normality, we also tried clus-
tered bootstrapped standard errors for all model specifications. Yet it turned out that they just
marginally deviate from the reported analytic ones.
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an important determinant of the scores assigned by the evaluators. Analyzing the
effect of quality is obviously hampered by the fact that “true quality” is not observed
and may not even exist, as quality is a matter of preference. What is – at least to
some extent - observed in the data is a dinner’s level of sophistication, primarily
the number of ingredients, which may be regarded as an approximation for quality.
In an alternative variant of the model (Model 4) we examine the role of objective
characteristics in more detail by also including the level of difficulty (assessed by
external experts) and the monetary costs of preparing the dinner. Moreover we take
account of the argument that the link between quality and sophistication may not
be monotone by including the squared number of ingredients as another regressor.
That is, we allow for an overreaching level of sophistication doing more harm than
good to a dinner’s quality.
In order to identify with respect to which individual characteristics dissimilarity
between cook and evaluator matters start with the basic model specification that
includes a single overall measure of dissimilarity, see section 3. Then we exclude
specific characteristics from this overall measure and let them enter the model indi-
vidually as squared cook-evaluator differences (Model 5). We check how the level of
significance (p-value) of the (residual) overall dissimilarity changes. A substantial
increase of the p-value indicates that the excluded characteristic is of major impor-
tance for the effect of overall dissimilarity. A substantial decrease of the p-value,
however, may indicate that dissimilarity with respect to the excluded characteristic
acts in the opposite direction than the estimated coefficient of the overall measure
suggest. We also report the estimated coefficient of the squared cook-evaluator
deviation of the respective characteristic, in order to cross-check these results.
The regression equation for the reference model can be written:
Pointsijr = β0 + βpos2 ∗ Cooking secondir + βpos3 ∗ Cooking thirdir
+ βpos4 ∗ Cooking fourthir + βpos5 ∗ Cooking fifthir + βcooked ∗ Already Cookedijr
+ βpts24 ∗ Average Evaluation Levelr + βspec24 ∗ Share V iewersr + βpop ∗ Populationr
+ βing ∗ Ingredientsir + βforaign ∗ Foreignr + βtime ∗ Y earr + βtimesq ∗ Y ear SQr
+ γ′cookxir + γ
′
evaluatorxjr + βsimilar ∗ dissimilarijr + ijr
(6.4.1)
The unknown coefficients β and γ are subject to estimation and ε denotes a
random error term. Note that i indexes cooks and j indexes evaluators, while r
indexes rounds of the show. Hence, the above equation indicates that some regressors
only vary between the rounds of the show (indexed with r) and some other regressors
vary within rounds across cook (indexed ir) or across evaluators (indexed jr), while
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very few vary across both cook and evaluators (indexed ijr). For the robustness
check concerning the initial 24 weeks the regression equation is modified as follows:
Pointsijr = β0 + βpos2 ∗ Cooking secondir + βpos3 ∗ Cooking thirdir
+ βpos4 ∗ Cooking fourthir + βpos5 ∗ Cooking fifthir + βcooked ∗ Already Cookedijr
+ βpts24 ∗ (1− Initial24r)Average Evaluation Levelr + βspec24(1− Initial24r) ∗ Share V iewersr
+ βpop ∗ Populationr + βing ∗ Ingredientsir + βforaign ∗ Foreignr + βtime ∗ Y earr
+ βtimesq ∗ Y ear SQr + γ′cookxir + γ′evaluatorxjr + βsimilar ∗ dissimilarijr + ijr
(6.4.2)
with Initial24r indicating the initial 24 weeks. In the specification that focuses
on the objective characteristics of a dinner, equation (6.4.1) is augmented by βingsq ∗
Ingredients2ir + βlevel ∗ Levelir + βprice ∗ Priceir. Finally, the specification that
focusses on the role cook-evaluator dissimilarity replaces βsimilar ∗ dissimilarijr in
(1) by βsimilar ∗ dissimilarresijr + θ(zir − zir)2 with z representing a subset of x and
dissimilarres denoting the Mahalanobis distance of the vectors of those individual
characteristics that are not included in z.
6.5 Empirical Analysis and Discussion
6.5.1 Results
In table 6.3, we report the results for the following estimations: “OLS reference”,
“ordered probit (Model 2)”, “OLS including the initial 24 weeks” (Model 3), “OLS
with ingredients² (Model 4)” and “OLS with deviations in cook evaluator charac-
teristics (Model 5)”. Estimates of the coefficients for individual characteristics (age,
gender, occupation) are reported in table 6.4 and will also be discussed. In table
6.5 we report the effect of excluding “female”, “migrant”, “age”, and “blonde” from
the aggregate “dissimilarity measure”.
Our first hypothesis sought to answer the question of whether voting behavior in
the past sets a sort of standard which influences voting behavior in later shows. We
measured this by including the variable “Av. evaluation level,” which is the average
evaluation level over the last 24 weeks. The variable does not have a significant
influence in any of the models. One possible explanation for this is that current
contestants do not watch past episodes on a regular basis. Furthermore, the objective
quality and a range of other social factors we consider in our analysis might dominate
any influence from past shows.
H2 tests for the effect of social in-game influences by looking at the effect of the
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position of a contestant. As in previous studies, we find that performing later in
the show leads to a significant increase in the evaluation level. A contestant who
performs on Friday (OLS reference - “cooking order (fifth)”) can expect to receive
0.588 more points than a contestant who performs on Monday. Considering that
the maximum point level is 10, this is a substantial advantage. When discussing
the theoretical background for H3, we provided a possible explanation for this be-
havior, direction-of-comparison effects. In the context of “The Perfect Dinner,” the
existence of this effect implies that contestants performing later have the advan-
tage of being able to provide some sort of unique experience in contrast to previous
contestants10.
H3 relates to the impact of having already cooked on voting behavior by over-
estimating ones’ own performance. The effect is significant and negative, meaning
that a contestant who has already cooked will evaluate a cook 0.318 points worse on
average than an evaluator who has not yet cooked (OLS reference – “Evaluator al-
ready cooked”). This outcome is in line with results from the literature which show
a bias towards ones’ own performance, especially after completing difficult tasks.
Since we also account for the direction-of-comparison effect, it is remarkable that
having already performed produces such a strong effect. Combining the two effects
leads to an overall expected positive effect for the person to perform last; everyone
else has already cooked and the contestant receives 1.08 points more in total than
the first contestant. H4 adresses the question of whether the level of sophistication,
measured by the number of ingredients, price level and difficulty plays an impor-
tant role. In the reference specification, the estimated coefficient for “ingredients”
is 0.008 and is significant at the 1% level. Thus, on average, using an additional
ingredient leads to 0.008 more points for the cook. In a richer specification (Model
4, Table 6.3) we add additional objective characteristics of the dinner, namely its
monetary cost and its level of difficulty and the squared number of ingredients. For
none of these additional variables the estimated coefficient is significant at the 10%
level. Despite of this, the richer specification still provides some indication for a
nonlinear effect of the number of ingredients. The p-value (0.117) for the test on the
quadratic term just marginally exceeds the threshold of 0.1 and, more important,
falls short of it (p-value: 0.083) if the clearly insignificant variables “price” and
“level” are excluded. In the latter specification the optimal number of ingredients
is about 96. This is in line with the argument that the marginal quality benefit of
additional ingredients decreases if a rich set is already used and might even become
10The last cook receives a “bonus” of 4* 0.588 via direction-comparison-effects compared to the
first cook (Table 6.3, OLS (reference), “cooking order (fifth)”), since each evaluator will give him
these 0.588 extra points. Since he is last in the cooking order, 4*0.318 must be subtracted since
every other cook that evaluated the last cook has already cooked (Table 6.3, OLS (reference),
“evaluator already cooked”). The overall effect is 1.08.
102
negative since a high quality meal depends on the correct combination of ingredi-
ents, not the bare number. What these results clearly show is that a certain level of
objective sophistication, measured by the number of ingredients, is appreciated by
the evaluators and rewarded.
6.5.2 Individual Characteristics and Dissimilarity
In table 6.4 we report the results for a range of individual characteristics for the cook
and evaluator respectively. The only variable that is significant in all estimations is
“blonde” for the evaluators. This implies that if an evaluator is “blonde”, cooks can
on average expect a higher rating than from non-blonde contestants. Furthermore,
“age” is significant for evaluators and blonde for cooks when we account for devi-
ations in individual characteristics (Model 5). Yet, in general, neither the cook’s
nor the evaluator’s individual characteristics seem to play a significant role, what is
warranted by the test on the joint significance of both groups of variables. However,
the result for the interplay of cook’s and evaluator’s characteristics is a very differ-
ent one. In all specifications that include “dissimilar” as only variable capturing the
interplay of personal characteristics, the estimated coefficient is negative and signif-
icant at the 10 percent level. This indicates that socioeconomic proximity leads to
more favorable evaluations, which is in line with Hypothesis 6. However, examining
the role of similarity in socioeconomic characteristics in more detail yields a more
complex picture. In the specification Model 5, we remove “female”, ”immigrant”,
”age”, and “blonde” from the aggregate measure and include these variables indi-
vidually as squared differences between cook and evaluator. There, the aggregate
effect of residual dissimilarity becomes much smaller (point estimate -0.137 com-
pared to -0.563 in the reference specification) and statistically insignificant, giving
rise to the conclusion that the characteristics (occupation, education) that remain
in “dissimilar” are of minor importance for biased evaluations in favor of more (resp.
less) similar cooks. Moreover, the coefficients of the individually considered charac-
teristics exhibit heterogeneity in the sign. This points to the fact that it is specific
to a particular characteristic whether similarity between cook and evaluator leads
to more or less favorable evaluations. For example, being of different age and not
sharing a migration status leads to more negative evaluation, where the former effect
is highly significant and the latter is still significant at the 10 percent level. One may
interpret these results as discrimination against cooks from a different age class or a
different ethnic background. Yet, the result is equally well explained by preferences
that systematically vary with age and migration status. In contrast, for gender and
hair color, the estimated coefficients indicate that dissimilarity with respect to these
characteristics leads to more favorable evaluations. This provides a strong indica-
tion that it is not dissimilarly per se that makes evaluators more critical about cooks
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and their performances. With respect to gender and hair color, the results are less
easily explained by preference heterogeneity with respect to what is regarded as a
high quality dinner and seem to point at discrimination against the evaluator’s own
sex and own hair color. In quantitative terms, if an evaluator is blonde, but the
cook is non-blonde, the evaluator will give a 0.078 higher rating than a non-blonde
evaluator. This general pattern of results is confirmed by table 6.5 where we report
results of excluding only one – unlike specification Model 5 where four variables are
jointly excluded – variable from the “dissimilarity” aggregate measure: Excluding
female or blonde increases the level of significance (p-value) of “dissimilarity”. In
contrast, excluding migrant or age decreases it, rendering it insignificant. This con-
firms that the negative effect of overall dissimilarity found in the specification of
reference is mainly due to similarity in age and migration status while dissimilarity
with respect to gender and hair color acts in the opposite direction. Moreover, all
excluded variables are individually significant at the 5% or 10% level, indication
that all dissimilarity in all four dimensions matter for how favorable the dinners are
evaluated.
Table 6.5: Testing for certain dimensions of dissimilarity
squared difference (residual) overall dissimilarity
Excluded from overall dissimilarity Estimated Coef. p-Value Estimated Coef. p-Value
none -0.563 0.055
female 0.069 0.062 -0.699 0.012
migrant -0.273 0.046 -0.285 0.356
age -0.354 0.000 -0.069 0.778
blond 0.091 0.038 -0.681 0.016
In Table 6.5 we report results of excluding only one variable from the “dissim-
ilarity” aggregate measure: Excluding female or blonde increases the significance
of “dissimilarity”. In contrast, excluding migrant or age decreases it, rendering it
insignificant. All excluded variables are significant by themselves at the 5% or 10%
level. The results we present in Table 6.5 differ from the results of the “OLS Model
5” estimation (Table 6.4), since we excluded all variables at the same time in the
estimation. In Table 6.5 only one of the variables was excluded at a time. For
example, when looking at the results for the variable “migrant” which implies that
this variable was excluded, “female”, “age”, and “blonde” are still part of “overall
dissimilarity”. Therefore, “migrant” and “age” are essential to the significance of
the aggregate measure, as “dissimilarity” becomes insignificant without either one
of them. If evaluator and cook are migrant and non-migrant, the cook will receive
a worse rating than if both were non-migrants or both migrants. Furthermore,
the larger the age difference between cook and evaluator, the fewer points will be
received by the cook.
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6.5.3 Discussion
We separated our analysis of the effect of social factors on the voting behavior of
participants in the TV show “The Perfect Dinner” into the following categories:
Monetary incentives, reputation, social in-game influences, objective quality, and
personal traits. The data did not allow us to present any results concerning the
monetary incentives since the monetary prize has remained the same throughout
the entire period of investigation. Our analysis showed that the impact of reputa-
tion measured by the voting behavior in previous shows did not have any significant
influence on voting behavior. The most significant difference in our approach, com-
pared to previous analyses of this TV show, was the introduction of a measure for
personal traits and objective quality or sophistication. Thus, the objective sophis-
tication and personal traits seem to dominate any potential reputational effect.
We measured social in-game influences via the following variables: the order
of cooking and whether a contestant has already performed. Both variables had
a significant effect on voting behavior. Our interpretation of the order of cooking
effect related to the literature on direction-of-comparison effects. Contestants that
perform later are able to exploit their informational advantage in an overall beneficial
fashion. However, the advantage of performing later comes at a cost. If an evaluator
has already performed, his evaluations tend to be more critical, which is in line with
the overestimation effect described in the literature once a difficult task has been
performed. Overall, the final contestant who performs, while having the largest gain
from direction-of-comparison effects, also faces the most critical audience.
We investigated the effect of objective sophistication by considering the impact
of the price and difficulty level, and the number of ingredients. The number of
ingredients plays an important role, as more ingredients imply a higher rating by
contestants. However, when excluding price and difficulty and including a squared
measure of ingredients, we found a quadratic relationship, with a maximum reached
at 96 ingredients. Since the relationship disappears when including price and dif-
ficulty, our overall interpretation of this result is that objective sophistication does
matter to some degree, as more ingredients usually imply a more difficult menu.
Finally, we considered the effect of individual characteristics. As a first step, we
included an aggregate measure of “dissimilarity”, which had a significant negative
effect on voting behavior. As a second step we took a closer look at the individ-
ual characteristics part of the aggregate measure, including them as squared cook-
evaluator differences. The difference evaluators “immigrant”, “blonde”, and “age”
were individually significant. Excluding them from the aggregate measure rendered
it insignificant. When excluding certain individual characteristics one by one from
the aggregate measure, we found that all were significant by themselves. Exclud-
ing “age” and “migrant” individually rendered the aggregate measure insignificant,
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implying that these characteristics play a pivotal role in voting behavior.
“The Perfect Dinner” certainly represents a special case in that contestants are
evaluators and subjects of evaluation at the same time. In most settings, these tasks
are performed separately. Therefore, one should be cautious in drawing general be-
havioral conclusions from these results. However, for similar settings, our study can
serve as an indication concerning the relative strengths of the behavioral effects..
Furthermore, we showed that when accounting for effects other than rank order
as in Haigner et al. (2010), the rank order effects still have a significant influence.
Factors such as being dissimilar to another person, having already performed, and
the objective sophistication also need to be taken into account. Concerning exter-
nal validity, our results can serve as an indicator for factors influencing evaluation
behavior when employees evaluate how well they work together. A number of com-
panies require their employees to evaluate their co-workers with whom they have
worked on projects. These evaluations often have a direct effect on promotions and
sometimes bonuses. Since the task that is evaluated can also be considered as a
complex one, like the cooking and evening entertainment in “The Perfect Dinner”,
our results can certainly serve as an indication of factors that influence evaluation
behavior. Also, evaluating co-workers which might aim for the same promotion
since they work in a similar area can have a direct effect on the probability of an
evaluator to receive that promotion himself, similar to the “The Perfect Dinner”
setting. Even though the potential prize (promotions, bonuses) is less tangible than
the prize money the winner receives in “The Perfect Dinner”, evaluators still know
that these evaluations are not without consequences. Thus, investigating behavioral
effects in employee evaluations can serve as an external validation of our results.
6.6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed whether factors such as reputation, social pressure, and
personal traits play a role in the voting behavior of contestants in the German
version of the TV format, “Come Dine With Me.” In the show, contestants must
prepare a dinner for each other during the course of a week. Each contestant evalu-
ates the dinners prepared by the co-contestants, and thus, each contestant is also an
evaluator. The individual evaluations remain concealed until the show is broadcast
approximately two months later. Therefore, disregarding any social or reciprocal
preferences, contestants have an incentive to evaluate each other’s performance neg-
atively in order to increase their chances of winning with no risk of immediate
detection. In order to investigate the impact of social pressure and reputational
factors, we estimated a number of regression models that explain the evaluation a
cook receives from an evaluator, based on a dataset including shows from the years
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2006-2011. We separated our analysis into the following categories: Monetary incen-
tives, reputation, social in-game influences, objective quality or sophistication, and
personal traits. Since the prize has remained the same throughout the years, the
data did not allow us to present any results concerning the influence of the monetary
dimension. We measured the impact of reputation by voting behavior observed in
previous shows. This had no significant influence on voting behavior once we ac-
count for the impact of the objective sophistication of a dinner and personal traits.
Therefore, reputational factors as measured by past voting behavior does not seem
to play an important role in this setting.
We analyzed the impact of social in-game influences by looking at the order in
which contestants cooked and whether a contestant had already prepared a dinner
prior to evaluating a co-contestant. Both of these factors have significant effects on
voting behavior. The later a contestant performs, the more points he receives on
average. One potential explanation for this stems from the direction-of-comparison
effect, which leads to a higher evaluation if a later contestant can exploit informa-
tion concerning the group’s expectations by providing a unique positive experience
in comparison to previous contestants. If a person has already cooked prior to eval-
uating another contestant, we find that the evaluator is more critical of the other
contestant’s performance. One potential explanation is that a contestant who has
already cooked attaches a higher weight to his own performance once it has been
carried out. This has been shown to be a relevant influence in the literature, usu-
ally termed the “overestimations” effect11. Another explanation might be that a
contestant that has performed is now free to be more critical of the performance of
others since he no longer has to fear being evaluated. However, this effect should
play no role because the evaluations remain concealed until the show is broadcast.
Nevertheless, this effect may still play a role since we have shown that a variety
of social components have an impact on voting behavior despite the fact that the
evaluations remain concealed.
The objective sophistication, measured by the number of ingredients of a dinner,
has a significant effect on voting behavior. The higher the sophistication, the higher
the evaluation received by a contestant. This effect has not been accounted for by
previous studies of the TV show “The Perfect Dinner.”
Finally, we considered the effect of personal traits. An aggregate measure of
dissimilarity based on a transformed Mahalanobis distance between the contestants’
socioeconomic characteristics had a negative statistically significant influence on vot-
ing behavior. Therefore, we concluded that dissimilarity has an important impact
on voting behavior. We also tested which of the personal traits plays the most im-
portant role. The traits “migration” and “age” turned out to be the most significant
11See for example Moore and Healy (2008).
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drivers of the aggregate measure, as excluding them rendered the aggregate measure
insignificant.
Concerning external validation our results can serve as an indicator for behavior
of employees when evaluating co-workers. These evaluations usually have monetary
consequences, although not has direct as the prize money in “The Perfect Dinner”,
the task evaluated is a complex one and evaluations are usually carried out anony-
mously. We leave such a test of external validity to future research.
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